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Objectives of the Report 
1. This Report assesses the impact of technological change on employment in Italy on 
the basis of the Community Innovation Survey (CIS). This evaluation is accomplished 
in view of more general considerations concerning the nature of technological 
unemployment in economic analysis and the consequent the policy prescriptions, and 
the possibility of assessing the overall impact of innovation from data at the enterprise 
level. 
2. The Report starts by comparing alternative views concerning the impact of 
innovation on employment in the context of the explanations of the recent poor 
employment performance of OECD countries. The discussion attempts also to resolve a 
main methodological problem concerning the use of CIS data: (un)employment is a 
macro-economic issue (concerning the economy as a whole), whereas CIS data are 
micro-economic (concerning the individual behaviour of a number of firms). What 
macro-economic inferences can be safely drawn from CIS data? 
Alternative interpretations of technological unemployment 
3. The neoclassical and the non-orthodox approaches are examined. The neoclassical 
one is confident about market forces leading to full employment. It is the prevailing 
academic school and is currently the main reference point for most of the national and 
international institutions. Non-orthodox economists emphasise the importance of 
demand management policies. 
4. Both approaches accept the idea that technical change can initially create 
unemployment. Divergence arise with regard to the existence of so-called 
'compensation effects' for technological unemployment. These compensation effects 
can take place on the supply-side or on the demand-side. 
'Compensation effects' on the supply-side 
5. The supply-side is discussed first. According to neoclassical economists 
'technological unemployment' does not exist in the long-run. The existence of demand 
functions for 'productive factors' (including labour) inversely related to their prices, 
characteristic of this theory, assures that a full-employment equilibrium is always 
realised as long as prices (including wages) are flexible. However, technological 
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unemployment is admitted as a short-run phenomenon due to structural imbalances in 
the labour market. 
6. An alternative point of view, initially advanced by the Classical economist David 
Ricardo, regards technological unemployment, in principle, as a lasting phenomenon. 
Recent criticism to the theoretical and empirical foundations of neoclassical theory 
reinforces this point of view. The absence of automatic endogenous 'compensation 
effects' in the non-orthodox approach, makes it more open to the existence of 
compensation effects on the demand side. 
'Compensation effects' on the demand-side 
7. The existence of compensation effects on the demand-side has been of particular 
concern to non-orthodox Keynesian and Schumpeterian economics. According to the 
former, it is long-period aggregate demand sustained by fiscal and monetary policies 
that is the 'engine' of growth. According to the latter, technical change, although it can 
initially displace workers, positively affects gross investment, consumption patterns 
and, therefore, aggregate demand. 
8. The Schumpeterian mechanism is not totally reliable. On the one side, product 
innovations can positively affect consumption, but other factors like a unequal income 
distribution may negatively affect it. On the other side, positive effects of innovation on 
gross investment are possible. None the less, they are neither a logical consequence of 
innovations (process innovations may be, for instance, 'capital saving' and reduce 
ceteris paribus gross investment); nor a upward trend of gross investment is to be 
expected by innovations. However, innovation-related investment may reduce to some 
extent the negative impact on gross investment of slower rates of aggregate demand. 
9. It has been persuasively argued, yet, that the 'golden', full-employment years of post-
war capitalism have shown a positive association between productivity growth, 
aggregate demand and employment. We argue that is doubtful that without policy 
intervention the virtuous relation between technical change, aggregate demand and 
employment growth would have ever been established. 
Technological unemployment and the present interpretations of unemployment 
10. Presently, the idea of 'technological unemployment' as a short-run phenomenon is 
part of the mainstream explanations of the recent poor employment performance in the 
industrialised countries. Structural change can create a mismatch between supply and 
demand of labour. For instance new skills are in short supply, whereas there is an 





labour market, .can transform a short-period disequilibrium into long-period high 
unemployment levels. 
11. None the less, in spite of much talk of widespread and faster technological change, 
it is far to be clear that the recent years have seen more structural change than, say, the 
fifties or sixties. In addition, measures to liberalise the labour market have not delivered 
the promised results. The substitution of low-inflation in the place of full-employment 
as the main policy objective of governments, and not technical change per se, appears 
to be the main cause of the dismal employment record. 
The role of the service-sector and the reduction of working-time 
12. There is wide consensus regarding the importance of the service sector as a source 
of future jobs in industrial economies. In contrast, the manufacturing sector is not 
expected to supply much employment in the future. Nonetheless, the US experience 
indicates that manufacturing can still be an important source of jobs. In addition, many 
services may be object of organisational and technological reshuffling. With these 
caveats, it is nonetheless reasonable to expect the service sector to contribute more to 
job creation than any other sector. The expansion of the service sector does not seem to 
meet limits other than the ability to pay of the potential consumers. Various alternatives 
are illustrated, including a critique of the popular idea of developing a so-called 'third' 
or 'non-profit' service sector. Another popular idea is the reduction of working-time. 
This is a long-period process that should not be taken as a substitute, but as 
complementary, to more traditional full-employment policies. 
The approach taken in the interpretation of CIS data 
13. The fact that, according to economic theory, the impact of innovation on 
employment depends on specific, mainly macro-economic, circumstances suggests that 
much caution should be taken in drawing conclusions from the analysis of the CIS firm-
based data. For instance, positive employment performance of the innovating firms 
might result at the cost of negative performance of non-innovating firms, so that the 
overall effect on the economy is uncertain. Moreover, it is not easy to separate the long-
terms effects of innovations on firms' performance from the short-period effects of the 
business cycle. More certain are the positive effects of technical change on employment 
through exports. For any single country, technological advantages can sustain 
employment, directly by supporting output of exporting firms, and indirectly by 
relaxing the balance of payment constraint to national expansionary economic policies. 
14. To sum up, the analysis of the employment and economic performance of 
innovating firms (compared to other group of firms) provide important information of 
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micro-economic nature, e.g. about the technological specialisation of country and the 
changing composition of employment. This has important implication for the macro-
economic level, especially from the point of view of the international competitiveness 
of the manufacturing sector. 
15. The Report presents a comparison of the employment and economic performance 
over the period 1990-1992 of three panels of firms : (i) almost 6,000 innovating firms; 
(ii) over 9,000 non-innovating firms, both surveyed by CIS; and (iii) over 26,000 firms 
covered by the 'Survey on the economic results of firms with more than 20 employees' 
(SERF). The latter panel contains all the firms included in CIS. SERF has been useful 
not only as a control group, but also because this survey integrated the information 
available from CIS with data on employment and other economic variables. Assuming 
that the business cycle affected the three groups to a similar degree, their comparison 
permits an evaluation of the impact of innovations on employment and other indicators 
of economic performance. 
The employment and economic performance of the Italian innovating firms 
16. Over the period 1990-92, innovating firms in aggregate perform better than non-
innovating firms and SERF firms in terms of number of employees, but not in term of 
total hours worked and output. Various considerations lead us to believe that hours 
worked is a better indicator. It may be concluded that, over this period, the set of 
innovating firms do not show a better employment performance than the other set of 
non innovating firms and SERF firms. The exception are the small innovating firms 
that do better than any other group both in terms of number of employees and of hours 
worked. 
17. Value added growth has also been lower in innovating firms compared to SERF 
firms. This mainly reflects the poor results of large firms. Small innovating firms 
exhibit the best performance of any group. Per-hour worked productivity growth has 
been higher in innovating firms. However, this outcome is associated to a poor 
performance in terms of output and hours worked in large firms, and to a positive one 
in small firms. 
18. Over half of Italian exports come from innovating firms. Over the period, these 
have shown in aggregate higher growth rates of exports and have widened their share of 
total exports. Small innovating firms have shown the largest growth rates, but still play 
a secondary role in total exports, with small non innovating firms playing a more 
significant role. The positive impact of innovation on exports indicates the existence of 
positive, direct or indirect, effects on employment. However, regression analysis 
'• 
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suggests that the positive effects shown by the aggregate data may be accompanied by 
' less systematic positive effects at finn level. 
19. Investment growth by innovating finns has been higher as an average over the 
period, and it has reacted less negatively to the recession. This suggest that, by 
affecting 'autonomous investment', innovation may have softened the impact of the then 
forthcoming recession. 
20. The share of women in the total labour force and in blue-collar workers is lower in 
innovating finns than in the other two groups. In addition is lower in R&D-based 
sectors and in large finns. There are not perceptible changes over the period. The share 
of white-collar workers is higher in innovating finns and, among them, higher in R&D-
based sectors. The share is slightly increasing over time. It is not possible to say 
whether this is a cyclical phenomenon (the recession usually hits blue collars first), or a 
structural change. Both factors are likely to be present. 
21. By combining different innovation inputs and outputs, different innovation types 
have been identified. Interestingly, a large degree of variety of innovative behaviour is 
present among small innovating finns. This approach confinned that, in the Italian 
experience, the most successful types of finns are small size, and tend to focus on 
traditional patterns of innovation. Another explorative technique, called discriminant 
analysis, has been used to- assess the impact of innovation variables on perfonnance 
variables. It also shows that non R&D innovation sources, product innovations and 
small size are related to above-average employment and export outcomes. 
Summary of the main findings and policy prescriptions 
22. The results of Part 1 of the Report indicate that technical change can create · 
unemployment. There are not automatic compensation effects to it neither on the supply 
side, nor on· the demand side. In spite of this, the experience of the Golden Age suggest 
that, given the right set of economic policies, it is possible to associate high job creation 
and sustained productivity growth. Most of the new jobs can be created in the service 
sector, given the long-tenn relative decline of the manufacturing sector. However, the 
latter can still grow in absolute tenns. 
23. The results of Part 2 show that the direct impact of innovations on Italian 
innovating finns has not been beneficial to employment, with some caveats, however. 
Small firms that innovated on the basis of non-R&D sources of knowledge show 
encouraging results. In addition, with regard to those firms that adopted R&D-based 
innovation patterns, the likely cause of the dismal outcomes is not that they put too 
much effort on innovation, but too little. Looking at the indirect effects of innovations 
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on employment via exports and investment, the impact has likely been more beneficial. 
It must be noted that, as in the case of direct effects of innovation, the most traditional 
innovation patterns were the most successful at generating positive indirect effects on 
employment. Italy has had too little innovation in the high-tech. sectors, accompanied 
by a variety of more successful non R&D-based innovative patterns in the small firms 
sectors. The encouraging performance of small innovating firms is an interesting result. 
However, it should be taken with some caution, since these firms are a minority, 
although significant, of the total population of small firms. 
24. To sum up, the Report suggests that on the demand side a greater job creation in 
Europe depends on a change in the economic policies adopted by governments. On the 
supply side, a problem emerges for Italy to obtain a more balanced composition of 
innovation patterns reinforcing her presence in the R&D-based sectors. From a 
European point of view, the success of the Italian small innovating firms may be of 
some example for developing areas within the Union. 
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Introduction 
. Object of this Report is the impact of technological change bn empl?.yment and 
unemployment both in theory and in practice on the basis of the results of the Italian 
Community Innovation Survey (CIS). 
Interest in this issue at establishment and firm levels has increased in the past years. 
Recently, a major conference was based on papers that adopted this approach (OECD, 
1995). In his conclusions, however, Prof.Zvi Griliches warned that whatever the interest 
of this approach at micro level, the implications at the macro-level are not certain. 
Griliches implicitly refers to the fact that at the enterprise level employment is not the 
only indicator of a good performance (since productivity growth may translate output 
growth in job losses). In addition, looking at the manufacturing sector, the overall 
performance cannot be inferred by observing a section of it, e.g. innovating firms, 
since, for instance, good performers may displace poor co:rp.petitors. Finally, whatever 
the employment patterns in the manufacturing sector, much of job creation takes place, 
nowadays, outside it. In spite of these limitations, important policy indications can be 
drawn from the micro-economic level concerning, for instance, innovation and labour-
market policies. However, since it is at aggregate level that the (un)employment issue is 
of major concern, the Report will explore the relationship between the micro-economic 
impact and the macro-economic ~onsequences of technical change in order to draw 
some indications for the economy as a whole. 
Prof. Griliches suggested that to 'better address more aggregate employment issues, it is 
important for future research to start exploring the interdependencies of firm behavior, 
examining how employment changes in one firm influence the employment in other 
firms' (OECD, 1995, p.ll). We believe that more basic issues are at stake here than the 
mere input/output relationship between firms and sectors. These involve the discussion 
of the existence, in principle, of 'compensation effects' to technological unemployment 
at the micro and macro levels. 
As a part of our assignment, we w~re asked to review the issue of technological 
unemployment in view of the more general concern and discussion about the poor 
employment performance in OECD countries and, in particular, European countries. 
This task fitted quite well in our research agenda since the relationship between the 
micro and macro aspects of the impact of innovation on employment could not be 
discussed without taking into account a broader sets of influences on employment level 
and relative policy prescriptions. 
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As a result, the first part of the Report sets out to provide both the necessary 
background for a correct use of CIS data in order to draw, along with inferences at 
micro-level, conclusions at aggregate level, and a contribution to the wider discussion 
on the nature of technological unemployment and on the causes and remedies of the 
dismal employment performance in Europe and elsewhere. 
The second part of the Report investigates the impact of innovations on employment 
and economic performance in about 6,000 Italian innovating firms. The analysis is 
carried out in two stages. In the first the performance of the innovating firms is 
compared to that of non-innovating units and of the total population of firms. In the 
second stage explorative techniques is used to classify innovative behaviour of 
innovating firms and to compare the performance of different types of innovative 
behaviour. In addition, discriminant analysis is used to assess the impact of innovation 
related variables on the performance of innovating units. 
The two parts of the Report are inter-dependent, but can be read independently from 
one another. The conclusions of the Report provide a synthesis of the results and policy 
prescriptions. 
Each chapter of the Report is opened by a box that summarised its main contents and 
policy prescriptions. In order to make the exposition as plain as possible, some relevant 
material have been put in appendixes for the interested reader. 
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Part I 
The impact of innovation on employment: review of the issues, policy 
prescriptions and suggestions for the interpretation of CIS data 
The relation between innovation and employment is of particular interest today. It is 
generally recognised that the recent rate of job creation in the industrialised countries 
has been rather poor, particularly in Europe, and unemployment has reached in the last 
fifteen years or so levels unknown in the preceding post-war period. Is technological 
change a cause of the current disappointing rate of job creation and high unemployment 
levels? 
This question entails a discussion of the existence of automatic, endogenous 
'compensation effects' to the reduction of labour inputs per unit of output determined by 
technical progress. 
Not surprisingly, we obtain different answer from different theories. The analytical and 
empirical strength of some of them are assessed here, in particular of the neoclassical 
approach on which the prevailing views are based, and the Schumpeterian. We will 
argue that the most sound view is the one in the non-orthodox tradition of Keynes, 
Kalecki, Kaldor and Sraffa, that we call the "Effective demand approach". 
Part I is based on a distinction between those approaches that look at the effects of 
technical change on employment by focusing on the supply side, and those approaches 
that look at the demand side too. 
Chapter 1 discusses the effects of technical change on the supply or production side. 
The neoclassical approach is discussed first. This view is the most influential ,nowadays 
among policy advisors, but it is not free of serious theoretical and empirical 
shortcomings. The non-orthodox view is discussed next. Conflicting policy 
prescriptions are compared and assessed. 
Chapter 2 explores the existence of 'compensation effects' on the demand side. A 
simple model in which economic growth depends on aggregate demand is introduced. 
The role of innovation as a determinant of aggregate demand is discussed next. This 
role is then compared to that of demand management policies to establish a virtuous 
circle between productivity, output and employment growth. 
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The last two chapters draw the implications of chapters 1 and 2 both for policy and for 
the applied research presented in the second part. Chapter 3 addresses current 
employment problems and policy implications, including a short discussion about the 
role of the service sector and reduction in working time in job creation. Chapter 4 
discusses the issue of the aggregate inferences that can be drawn from micro-data. 
Two appendices spell out in more details on our macro-economic approach. 
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Chapter 1 
Technological unemployment on the supply side 
This chapter explores whether there are compensation effects for employment on the production side. A 
positive answer is provided by mainstream theory that relies on neoclassical adjustment mechanisms. 
The conventional interpretation of the poor employment performance of OECD countries has identified 
technical change as a main cause of structural maladjustment. The policy prescriptions generated by 
mainstream theory aim at facilitating the adjustment process by removing the institutional obstacles to it. 
The non-orthodox point of view recovers and develops along modern lines the Ricardian criticism to the 
existence of compensation effects on the supply side. In terms of policy prescriptions, the Ricardian 
position shares some of the supply side policies put forward by mainstream economists (e.g. better 
education and training), but does not see them as sufficient. Rather, this approach suggests the possibility 
of compensation effects on the demand side. 
By compensation effects on the supply side is meant the existence of mechanisms on 
the production side which assure that, over a period of time, the workers displaced by 
innovations find new jobs. In this chapter 'Say's Law' is assumed, that is whatever is 
produced will be sold. Hence, the question is whether after an innovation market forces 
lead production (to which demand is by definition always adjusted) towards a full 
employment level. Two points of view are discussed: the mainstream and the non-
orthodox. 
1.1. The Mainstream point of view 
The presentation of the mainstream point of view is subdivided into three parts: the 
basic analytical background is presented first; the recent New Growth Theory (NGT) is 
sketched next; finally, the connection with the mainstream interpretation of the current 
poor employment performance of OECD countries is specified along with the 
associated policy prescriptions. 
1.1.1. Technical change and employment: the basic theory 
According to the mainstream approach the compensation effect is essentially effected 
through the substitutability between factors of production, this substitutability brought 
about by two processes. 
The first and most direct one is the change in the proportion in which the factors of 
production are used in the production process. According to the theory, the additional 
employment of one unit of a productive factor· (say, labour), given the amount of the 
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other factors, will lead to output increases that are positive but progressively smaller. 
That is, the marginal product of labour (the additional output obtained by using one 
more 'dose' of labour with the given quantities of the other factors) is decreasing. 
Accordingly if, for example, the labour supply suddenly rises and the price of labour 
falls as the additional labourers compete for employment, entrepreneurs will find it 
more profitable to use techniques that involve a higher proportion of labour inputs in 
combination with the other factors, up to the point at which the marginal product of 
labour equals the new wage level. If the wage continues falling until there are no 
unemployed labourers. This will lead towards the full utilisation of the additional 
labour supply, albeit at a lower real wage. 
The second substitution mechanism is an indirect one, since it works through changes 
in consumers' optimal choice of their consumption baskets as the relative prices of 
factors and goods change. Again, let us suppose an increase in labour supply and fall in 
the real wage. According to the theory, this brings about a fall in the relative prices of 
the goods that are produced with labour-intensive techniques (i.e. techniques entailing a 
higher proportion of labour to the other inputs). This fall tends to alter consumers' 
demand in such a way that the (now cheaper) labour intensive commodities will be 
demanded and produced in a higher proportion than they were before, thereby 
increasing the demand for labour in the economy. Thus, even if there is no factor 
substitution in production (i.e. the 'production function' has fixed coefficients), the 
economy will tend to full employment. 
Innovations will generally cause an increase in the 'labour supply' available in the 
e~onomic system, measured in 'efficiency units' (every thing else constant, the 
'efficiency' or productivity of each worker is increased by the innovation). Innovations 
will also increase the demand for labour (as the product that can be obtained by adding 
units of labour- the marginal product- is now higher than the going real wage). 1 If the 
former effect prevails (if the innovation is 'very labour saving'), the innovation may 
initially create some unemployment. The competition among workers, however, will 
induce a fall in the real wage and the inception of the two mechanisms just illustrated. 
In this analytical framework innovation has the same effect as an increase in the 
quantity of production factors: as these tend to be always fully .employed, such an 
increase will necessarily result in an increase in the level of production and income 'as 
soon as the liberated resources can be effectively transferred to new uses'. (Hicks, 1932; 
p.l21). 
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1.1.2. Endogenous technical change 
A recent body of research, known as 'New growth theory' (NGT), taking inspiration 
from well-known results in the neoclassical tradition (Cesaratto, 1996), links the 
accumulation of social knowledge (either in the form of embodied technical change, or 
of human capital) to the 'endogenous' decision of the community to invest in R&D, 
design, training activities and the like (Romer, 1986; Lucas, 1988). 
Consistent with the neoclassical tradition, NGT looks at economic growth as a supply 
side phenomenon in which saving is the 'engine' of growth. NGT reinforces this point 
of view by including thrift as a determinant of technical change. NGT scholars share the 
conventional view that innovations only create frictional unemployment 'when labor is 
heterogeneous and the skill composition of new hires does not necessarily match the 
skill composition of displaced workers' (Helpman 1992: 264). 
1.1.3. Technical change and the mainstream interpretation of unemployment 
While according to the mainstream view in market economies there is a continuous 
tendency towards the full employment of labour, it is yet admitted that some persistent 
unemployment will exist. The conventional explanation of persistent unemployment is 
based on the concept of the natural unemployment rate (sometimes also NAIRU- non 
accelerating inflation unemployment rate). The latter is the equilibrium unemployment 
rate that corresponds to the maximum level of employment attainable by the economic 
system, given the existence of continuously occurring changes, costs in acquiring 
information, and the existence of market imperfections, i.e. non competitive elements, 
particularly in the labour market. Equilibrium is associated to some unemployment 
because in any economic system 'shocks' (i.e. structural changes, including technical 
innovation) are continuously occurring. These are at the root of two major components 
of the natural unemployment rate: 
i) Mismatch between labour supply and demand: these 'shocks' will tend to determine a 
difference between the characteristics (skills, education etc.) of the labour supply and 
those required by the employers. 
ii) Voluntary unemployment: the 'shocks' also alter equilibrium relative prices and 
wages. Economic agents incur costs and take time to acquire information about these 
- new wages, so that for each occupation there will not be a single wage offered by firms, 
but a distribution of wages. This, it is argued, renders rational for workers to spend 
some time collecting information and searching for the best opportunities while 
remaining unemployed (Phelps et al., 1970). This type of voluntary unemployment, 
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other things constant, would be increased by an intensification of the 'shocks' and 
diminished by increasing the incentives to adjust rapidly to changes - abolishing 
unemployment benefits typically would have this effect. 
In addition, equilibrium can be associated to unemployment due to a third factor: 
iii) obstacles to free competition and market imperfections. Technical change may also 
raise the natural unemployment rate that results from this factor. 'Insiders-outsiders' 
models have pointed to the ability of employed workers (the 'insiders') and their unions 
to fix wages at a level higher than that compatible with full employment. This ability is 
said to derive from the bargaining advantage due to the existence of hiring and firing 
costs, which are to an extent determined by institutional factors (for example, the 
existence of costly firing procedures). The insiders' objective (according to this view) is 
to obtain the maximum wage compatible with preserving their employment. Hence, the 
marginal product of labour at the given employment level fixes a maximum to the real 
wage. If an initial 'shock' due to an innovation diminishes the number of jobs in some 
firms, the remaining 'insiders' in these firms will tend to fix the wage at the new level 
compatible with the lower employment. As employment diminishes, other things 
constant, the marginal product of labour rises2, and so does the real wage fixed by 
insider workers. Were it not for the bargaining power of the insiders, the flexibility of 
wages would have allowed the recovery of the lost jobs in those same firms or 
elsewhere in the economy. 
1.1. 4. The mainstream policy prescriptions 
The mainstream views on the impact of technical change are very influential on the 
national and international institutions (the main example being the influential OECD's 
Jobs Study, 1994; for the diffusion of this ideas cf. The Economist, February 1995). In 
applied research based on these views, the existence of 'frictional' problems following 
the introduction of innovative technologies is generally admitted. The adjustment may 
be slow when it entails, as it generally would do, shifts in employment from one sector 
to another, particularly if these involve changes in the skills required, and if these are 
highly specialised and difficult to acquire. In such circumstances the possibility of 
mismatch between the characteristics of the available unemployed labour force and 
those required to fill existing vacancies is high. In addition, technical change tends to 
increase the unemployment due to voluntary search activity and to the obstacles to free 
competition in the labour market. 
Accordingly, attention should be focused on flexibility· and individual incentives to 
adjust rapidly to a changing environment (e.g. OECD, 1994) in order to create an 
:. 
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institutional framework favourable to mobility. In this perspective the education and 
training/retraining systems are also very important. Policy prescriptions from NGT are 
consistent with this view by pointing to supply side policies devoted to sustain 
embodied innovation, R&D, education and the like. 
To sum up, according to the mainstream interpretation, innovation and structural 
change may - other things constant - increase the 'natural' or equilibrium unemployment 
determined by mismatch, 'search', and market imperfections. The adjustment process 
may require time, and may be hindered by inadequate retraining opportunities or by 
other obstacles to the required mobility and wage flexibility. It is to the existence of 
various institutional rigidities - e.g. unemployment benefits or strong unions - that the 
disappointing employment performance should be attributed, particularly in Europe. 
1.2. The non-orthodox point of view 
1.2.1. The Ricardian case 
At the beginning of the last century, the English classical economist David Ricardo 
initially maintained and later rejected the opinion, similar to the one just illustrated, that 
the 'application of machinery to any branch of production' is 'a general good, 
accompanied only with that portion of inconvenience which in most cases attends the 
removal of capital and labour from one employment to another' (1951, p.386). This 
opinion is based on the idea that an equal amount of labour employed with the newly 
invented machinery will give rise to a greater real income, beneficial to all social 
classes. 
Eventually however Ricardo came to the different conclusion that 'the discovery and 
use of machinery' could be 'injurious to the labouring class' (1951, p.390). To 
appreciate Ricardo's argument, think of labour as a generic input, part of the circulating 
capital. Suppose that the introduction of an innovation allows the production of the 
same or even greater amount of social income by using half of the input. The use of the 
input is correspondingly reduced. If that input is labour, there is technological 
unemployment3• Observe that Ricardo did not rely on wage flexibility and 'factor 
substitution', a mechanism later introduced by neoclassical economists, as a 
compensation effect4• 
The interest and the force of the 'Ricardian case' has been renewed by the recovery of 
the Classical approach by Sraffa ( 1951) who noted the absence in the classical approach 
of the substitution mechanisms later envisaged by the neoclassical economists. It is the 
absence of these substitution mechanisms that explains the possibility of persistent 
unemployment in the Ricardian framework (for a formal demonstration of this 
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proposition see Montani, 1985). Failure to perceive this crucial difference has often led 
to misinterpretations of the 'Ricardian effect' as a 'transitory' or 'short run' phenomenon 
occurring in the transition towards a new, full employment equilibrium and, similarly, 
to associate it to particular assumptions concerning the nature of technical progress 
(Wicksell, 1981 [1924], Schumpeter, 1954; Katsoulacos, 1986). 
In addition, Sraffa suggested that not only the neoclassical substitution mechanisms 
were absent in the classical approach, but that their later introduction was flawed by 
logical inconsistencies. This inspired in the 60s what has probably became the most 
famous controversy in economic analysis, that on the neoclassical notion of 'capital' 
(Harcourt, 1972; for more recent discussions see Eatwell et al., 1990; Kurz, Salvadori, 
1995, Ch. 14). 
1.2.2. Logical inconsistency of neoclassical theory 
Put simply, this controversy pointed to the peculiar nature of the 'capital', that it is not 
an 'original' factor measurable in some conventional unit, as is the case for labour or 
land, but it is a produced commodity measurable only in 'value'. This has important 
consequences for the reliability of the two neoclassical substitution mechanisms 
envisaged in § 1.1.1. 
The first substitution mec~anism - direct substitution in production - predicts that 
when, for example, the wage rate falls, methods of production using more labour 
relative to the other inputs will become more profitable. Sraffa ( 1960) and other 
contributors to the capital controversy of the 60s have shown that this is not the general 
case, and that when there are a multiplicity of techniques and 'heterogeneous' capital 
goods (that is many kinds of capital goods), the so-called 're-switching of techniques' 
makes the neoclassical prediction unreliable: when the wage rate falls less labour 
intensive techniques may become profitable. This is because as distribution varies the 
relative prices of the produced capital goods used directly and indirectly in the 
production of any commodity will change. Thus it may happen that the same technique 
- using directly and indirectly a certain amount of labour per unit of net output - is the 
most profitable (least costly) for low levels of the real wage rate as well as for high 
levels of it, while a different technique is the most profitable at 'intermediate' levels of 
the wage rate (Garegnani, 1970). 
The second mechanism, indirect substitution through changes in consumption patterns, 
requires a) that as, for example, the wage rate declines, the relative price of the labour-
intensive goods falls; b) that this is followed by a larger consumption of the relatively 




Capital theory controversy. It has been shown (Sraffa, 1960) that as the wage rate 
diminishes, the relative price of any commodity may alternately fall and rise, so that no 
a priori expectations as to the direction of the change is justified. The second step (b), 
on the other hand, is not certain, as income effects (i.e. changes in individual income 
levels determined by the change in distribution and prices) may alter demand patterns in 
such a way as to offset the effects of substitution in consumers' choices. Results 
obtained in general equilibrium theory show that, even with the usual neoclassical 
assumptions on individual consumers' behaviour, it cannot be proved that the aggregate 
excess demand functions for goods are a decreasing function of their prices (Kirman 
1989). 
It can just be added that the empirical results concerning demand curves for factors of 
prc;>duction, particularly labour, do not appear very robust (Anyadike-Danes, Godley, 
1989; Zenezini, 1993; Card, Krueger 1996). 
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1.3. Policy implications 
To those trained in neoclassical economics, the "Ricardian approach" may at first sight 
appear as too primitive, and missing important aspects of consumers' and entrepreneurs' 
behaviour. We have shown, however, that neoclassical substitution mechanisms require 
assumptions concerning the direction of the substitution taking place when relative 
prices and distribution change, which are undermined by theoretical results. Nor can it 
be claimed that, to counter the theoretical difficulties, there are strikingly supportive 
empirical results. 
Accordingly, the modem non-orthodox theory confirms Ricardo's opinion that there are 
no necessary compensation effects to technological unemployment. Some of the supply-
side policies proposed by mainstream economists, especially those concerning 
education and R&D, are useful in themselves, but should not be relied upon as the only 
way to reach full employment. Other measures, leading to undermine labour bargaining 
power, may make the situation worse (not only in terms of social justice), by weakening 
the demand for consumption goods, as shown in the next chapter. 
While the role of compensation effects on the demand side is ruled out in principle by 
neoclassical theory (since in this view substitution mechanisms always lead the system 
towards the level and composition of output that ensures the maximum possible 
utilisation of all the existing resources), the Ricardian approach is not necessarily 
associated to the acceptance of Say's law, and once this is rejected, the analysis is open 




1 The negatively sloped labour demand schedule which represents the employment level chosen by the 
employers at different real wages coincides with the marginal product of labour at different employment 
levels (see text above) . An increase in the quantity of the other factor of production (say,' capital') to 
which labour is applied will shift this schedule outwards (the marginal product obtained by the same 
quantity of labour will be higher if labour is used in association with a greater quantity of 'capital'). 
Innovations generally will increase the supply in 'efficiency units' of both factors ('capital' and labour in 
our example). The increase in the supply of land will shift outwards the demand schedule for labour, thus 
raising labour demand at the given wage level, but will also increase labour supply in efficiency units. If 
the latter effect prevails the real wage rate compatible with full employment will have to fall. The case of 
a 'labour-saving' innovation was first isolated by the English economist John Hicks [1932].1n this case the 
effect of technical change is such that in equilibrium (i.e. when all factors are fully employed) even if the 
marginal product of both labour and capital are increased, the latter is so in a greater proportion. Hicks 
called "very labour saving" the innovations leading to a fall in the full employment equilibrium real 
wage. 
2 According to neoclassical theory, given the capital stock, a decrease in the amount of employed labour 
would raise the marginal product of labour (i. e. the product obtained by the last unit of labour employed 
with the given capital) 
3 In addition, if the innovation is such that part of the circulating capital_is substituted for by fixed capital, 
the level of total production - i.e. inclusive of intermediate goods - will be reduced, thus also causing 
unemployment. If the input is labour, it is the production of consumption goods that is reduced (the 
Classical economists regarded subsistence goods aS part of circulating capital). In other words, the 
introduction in any industry of a new technique leading, if there is competition, to a fall in production 
prices, will entail the disappearance of that part of the social income that derived from the production of 
the commodity with the old method (Garegnani, 1962, p. 98). 
4 Ricardo, that shared Say's law, conceded that the negative effect of the innovation on employment could 




Technological unemployment on the demand side 
The chapter maintains that long-period output depends on growth of Effective demand. It is claimed that 
the "autonomous components" of aggregate demand determine the long-run trend of Effective demand. 
The autonomous components include "autonomous investment" induced by technical change. The 
positive link between innovation and autonomous investment advocated by Schumpeterian economists is 
examined. The positive association between output and productivity growth underlined by the 
'Regulation approach' is also illustrated. The conclusions is that although innovation (especially product 
innovations) can positively affect investment and employment, this is not granted. More certain are the 
positive effects of innovation on a country's export performance. The economic policies oriented towards 
full employment are the major explanation of the virtuous circle between productivity and output growth 
during the first post-war decades. 
2.1. Technological change and Effective demand 
According to the mainstream view the main explanation for economic growth lies in the 
saving propensity of the community in so far as a higher saving rate would allow the 
production of more investment goods that increase the capital stock. In his major work, 
the General Theory published in 1936, the British economist J.M.Keynes challenged 
this view by showing that since productive capacity is generally not fully utilised, 
within the limit of the full utilisation of the existing capital stock a larger amount of 
investment does not require a prior saving decision. On the opposite, the income 
generated by the fuller utilisation of capacity would generate an amount of saving equal 
to the investment decisions. 
Mainstream economists circumscribed this criticism to short-period situations of low 
business and financial confidence arguing, however, that in those circumstances active 
fiscal and monetary policies were necessary to reach full employment. This was the 
conventional wisdom shared by the national and international institutions until, in the 
late sixties, the Monetarist revolution begun to re-establish the pre-Keynesian doctrines 
as the prevailing view. Although the Monetarist revolution has subsequently receded, 
the currently prevailing mainstream approach still reflects pre-Keynesian views. 
More faithful followers of Keynes have tried the opposite road of extending his analysis 
to the long-period claiming that also in the long-run (when the productive capacity can 
vary) investment is independent from the saving supply. Investment would depend 
instead on long-period expected aggregate demand. Accordingly, long-period 
productive capacity and, given the technology, long-period employment also d~pend on 
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the long-period level of effective demand1• Innovations affect the labour requirements 
per unit of output and may negatively affect the employment associated with any level 
of output. However, high growth rates can, in principle, compensate decreasing labour 
requirements2• Does innovation compensate technological unemployment by positively 
affecting effective demand? To answer this question we shall sketch a simple verbal 
model of the determination of the level of long-period aggregate demand in order to 
single out with some precision where technical change matters (for additional details cf. 
Serrano 1995, 1996 and appendix 1). 
2.2. An Effective demand approach to the determination of long-period output 
In a long-period Keynesian approach productive capacity tends to adjust to long-period 
effective demand through gross investment. The components of effective demand can 
be split in two groups, induced and autonomous according to whether they depend on 
expected aggregate demand. 
Induced components of Effective demand 
Induced consumption mainly derives from 'contractual incomes', principally 
wages and salaries, whose amount is determined after production decisions have 
been taken by entrepreneurs on the basis of expected demand. Hence, induced 
consumption cannot determine the pattern of Effective demand since is generated 
by it. 
Gross investment IS actually divided in two components3: induced and 
autonomous. The first component, induced capacity-generating investment, 
' includes all purchases of produced means of production that can have capacity-
generating effects in the sense that they necessarily add to the potential supply of 
gross output of the economy. These expenditures are to be considered induced 
precisely because of the fact they have capacity-generating effects and hence will 
tend to be carried out only if the overall expected expansion of aggregate demand 
justifies them. Induced investment, therefore, cannot be taken as a long-period 
determinant of Effective demand unless we reason in circle. Autonomous 
investment will be considered below as part of autonomous expenditure. 
Autonomous components of Effective demand 
Autonomous expenditure (or 'Final demand', Garegnani, 1962) is neither generated 
by the expected levels of aggregate demand, since it does not by definition create 
productive capacity, nor depends in principle on 'earned incomes'. Autonomous 
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expenditure thus comprises all the sources of potential discretionary or 
autonomous injections of purchasing power in the economy. It includes: 
(a) Total government spending, whose level is autonomously decided by 
Government and whose multiplying effects generate the amount of taxation and 
saving necessary to finance it4 ; 
(b) Total exports whose level depends, ceteri~ paribus, on foreign demand. 
(c) Autonomous consumption, financed by consumers' credit and demobilisation 
of wealth 
(d) Autonomous business expenditures, including R&D or managerial expenses, 
that do not depend on, nor directly lead, to capacity creation; and autonomous 
investment, that is that part of gross investment not induced by expected demand 
but by technical change. 
The level and rates of growth of the autonomous components of aggregate demand 
explain the levels of induced consumption and induced investment. Effective demand, 
which is the sum of the autonomous and induced components of aggregate demand, 
would in tum explain the long period level of output (and capacity) and, given the 
technology, the employment level (Kaldor, 1970; Kalecki, 1971; Garegnani, 1962, 
1992; Serrano, 1995, 1996)5• Fig.6.1 shows the working of the model. 
Let us now find out where technical change matters and can generate a compensation 











Fig.6.1 - A simple Keynesian long-period model 
2.3. Technical change and the autonomous components of effective demand 
Technical change can affect Effective demand (a) via its effects on the aggregate 
marginal propensity to consume (which tells us how much induced consumption will be 
generated by a given level of Final demand); (b) by affecting the aggregate capital-
output (acceleration) ratio (which tells us how much gross investment will be induced 
by expected aggregate demand) and (c) through its effects on the growth of the 
autonomous expenditure (which is the final 'engine' of growth). Fig.6.2 pictures the 





















legenda:+ positive effect;- negative effect;? uncertain effect 
Fig.6.2 - The effects of product and process innovations 
in the long-period ·Keynesian model 
Let us consider them in order. 
(a) In what regards induced consumption, product innovations may play the 
positive effect of keeping, by continuously creating new needs and by making 
consumer durables obsolete, the marginal propensity to consume out of 
'contractual incomes' at high levels6• On the other hand, process innovations, 
which invariably tend to increase labour productivity and displace workers can 
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(and in the European context probably do) shift distribution away from wage-
income, something that depresses the aggregate marginal propensity to consume 
(see Arestis, Howells, 1995). Income distribution is, therefore, an important 
determinant of the final effects of innovations. For instance, if real wages increase 
with productivity, the fall of production prices that follow process innovations is 
quite substantial, mass consumption of previously inaccessible products and 
services might become possible, thus increasing the marginal propensity to 
consume (Garegnani, 1962, p.98). The negative effects of process innovations are 
thus compensated by a larger consumption of the now cheaper commodities. 
(b) Different forms of technical progress may affect the capital-output ratio in 
various ways. If technical change is neutral7 it will neither stimulate nor reduce 
induced investment. If it is capital-saving it will ceteris paribus clearly reduce 
investment. Only if technical change is capital-using will it increase the capital-
output ratio and hence stimulate induced investment8. 
(c) Innovation can have positive effects on autonomous expenditure. Product 
innovations can foster autonomous consumption both of the working classes (the 
more, the more income distribution and consumers credit are favourable to mass 
consumption) and of the wealthier classes (that can use their financial wealth to 
have access to new products9). Various theories and experience suggest that 
technological advantages are a main determinant of export performance. Other 
factors, including the foreign exchange rate policy, can of course affect the 
establishment of a virtuous circle between export performance and productivity 
growth (Kaldor, 1970). Technological advantages reduce also import penetration. 
Relaxing the balance of payment (or foreign) constraint allows, in tum, more 
expansionary domestic economic policies (McCombie, Thirwall, 1994 ). 
Autonomous business expenditure such as R&D may have a positive linkage with 
the national technological patterns (more or less R&D oriented, see Cesaratto, 
Mangano, 1993) and the expectations of profitable results from R&D. Finally, 
technological competition has been traditionally seen as a main determinant of 
autonomous investment. 
The effects of innovation on induced and autonomous consumption and autonomous 
investment are seen by economists of different persuasions (including Schumpeterian, 
Keynesian, but also, as their last resort, neoclassical economists) as the major way 
through which a compensation effect on the demand side can reveal itself. 10 
We agree that product innovations may generate positive effects on consumption and, 
by this way on induced investment, given a. suitable income distribution and the 
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availability of cheap consumers credit. A discussion of the relationship between 
innovation and autonomous investment, that we name after his most famous proponent 
the 'Schumpeterian thesis', is presented in appendix 2. There we conclude that the 
existence of positive compensation effects to technological unemployment on the 
demand side through (autonomous) gross investment is a possible but not a necessary 
result. Empirically, however, a positive association between productivity and demand 
growth (so that employment was not badly affected by technical change) can be found 
in the so-called years of 'golden age' of post-war capitalistic economies. If the 
'Schumpeterian thesis' does not provide a satisfactory account of the association, how 
can we explain it? 
2.4. The association between productivity and demand growth and the role of 
policy intervention 
Table 2.1 shows a clear association between productivity (i.e. technical change) and 
output (i.e. demand) growth for the industrial sector. The association of high demand 
and productivity growth in the first period produced a posit~ve employment growth rate 
(0.37% ); whereas the association of low demand and productivity growth in the second 
period resulted in a negative employment growth rate ( -0.64% ). The mere existence of 
this correlation shows that a high rate of technical change may be associated with high 
income growth and full employment (and vice versa). The association between output 
and productivity growth ha.S been particularly emphasised by a group of Anglo-French 
economists, named 'Regulationists'11 • The Regulation school explains the virtuous 
circle through the institutional context favourable to workers' consumption. However, 
whereas the 'wage-led regime' can have had positive effects with respect to product 
innovations, it cannot have been enough according to our view. 
By increasing the marginal propensity to consume, a 'wage-led regime' magnifies the 
effects on . the level of capacity generated by a given level of the autonomous 
expenditure. It cannot, however, explain how autonomous expenditure is generated. We 
believe that two forces were behind the high rate of growth of autonomous expenditure 
in the fifties and sixties: government expenditure and export growth (see below § 3.1 ). 12 
We reach therefore the conclusion that whereas technical change may be positively 
associated to economic growth, it is doubtful that without the expansionary national 
and international policy set-up that marked the post-war period (including high military 
spending [Pivetti, 1992]) this sort of virtuous circle would have ever been established 13• 
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2.5. Policy implications 
The association of high productivity growth with near-full-employment during the first 
post-WW IT decades shows that technical change is not necessarily linked to 
technological unemployment. 
It can be argued, however, that this has not happened 'because (or at least not 
exclusively because) of compensation effects to technological unemployment on the 
demand side. The effects of process and product innovations on gross investment 
cannot, however, be taken for granted, although those of product innovations on 
consumption patterns are generally more favourable (given suitable income 
distribution). From the experience of the 'golden age' we draw the conclusion that the 
pursuit of full-employment policy requires suitable national and international economic 
policies to be adopted. These are policies favourable to autonomous demand growth 
through government expenditure and exports, along with income policies favourable to 
mass consumption. 
For each single country, however, there is one case in which the national innovation 
capabilities may have positively affected the trend of a specific autonomous component 
of demand. This is the case of exports. Although affected by other circumstances, such 
as foreign exchange rate policy and international macro-policies, technological 
advantages are a main determinant of each single country's export performance. Exports 
may also favour national reflationary policies by relaxing the foreign trade constraint. 
Germany and Japan are, of course, the countries with the greater evidence for the 




Tab. 3.1· Value added, productivity and employment in the industrial sector. 
Annual rates of growth. Selected Oecd countries. 1960-1990. 
Value added Productivity Employment 
1960..1975 
USA 3.79 2.54 1.25 
CAN 5.03 2.58 2.45 
JPN 7.96 6.25 1.71 
B 4.91 5.27 -0.36 
FR 3.90 3.42 0.48 
WGR 3.21 4.39 -1.18 
ITA 4.90 4.75 0.15 
NL 5.35 6.50 -1.15 
UK 0.39 1.83 -1.44 
1976-1990 
USA 2.83 1.93 0.90 
CAN 2.20 1.30 0.90 
JPN 5.52 4.85 0.57 
B 1.47 4.38 -2.91 
FR 1.15 2.90 -1.75 
WGR 1.54 1.80 -0.26 
ITA 2.99 3.75 -0.76 
NL 0.73 1.06 -0.33 
UK 1.81 3.69 -1.88 
1960-1975 4.42 4.05 0.37 
1976-1990 2.19 2.83 -0.64 
Source: Pini 1994 
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Footnotes 
1 Since no automatic tendency of aggregate demand to adjust to productive capacity is envisaged, the 
'Effective' level of aggregate demand will in general be different from the 'Notional' or 'Potential' level 
corresponding to the full utilisation of capacity. Effective demand is analytically defined as the amount of 
aggregate output demanded at normal prices (see appendix 2). 
2 As shown by the identity-equation 
e = y- p, 
where, respectively, the symbols are the growth rate of employment, of total income and of productivity. 
3 Gross investment includes the replacement of obsolete capital goods and net additions to productive 
capacity. Obsolescence can be physical and economic. Economic obsolescence is caused mainly by 
techrtical change. 
4 Government spending does not, therefore, absorb saving otherwise devoted to investment, as generally 
maintained by mainstream economics (for recent contributions: Pressman, 1995; Symposium on the 
Journal of Postkeynesian Econt?mics, 1994-95). 
5 It is important to observe that the employment creation power of each of the autonomous components of 
aggregate demand is not the same, and some disaggregate analysis would be in order here. To give an 
example, Government expenditure on social services or public works has a direct impact on job creation, 
in addition to the indirect one due to the multiplicative effects on induced investment and consumption. 
Similarly, a rise in visible exports increases the demand for manufacturing goods and also sets out a 
multiplicative effect. However, the increase of demand for manufacturing good might have a smaller 
direct impact on employment given the lower elasticity of employment with respect to output in this 
sector. This has been the Italian experience in the recent export-led growth that has brought about little 
job creation. Also the composition of induced consumption and induced investment matters. The general 
opinion is that the larger the share of induced demand for services, the greater the number of jobs 
generated by the expansion (see § 3.2.2). The service sector is, of course, quite heterogeneous, and the 
employment elasticity to output is not the same everywhere 
6 Income distribution is particularly relevant for the impact of product innovation on consumption 
patterns. The Anglo-French Regulation school (e.g. Boyer, 1988) sees in the institutional contest 
favourable to the translation of productivity growth in higher real wages and growing consumption 
patterns a key factor in the generation of a virtuous circle between productivity and output growth in the 
post-war period (what they call "wage-led regime"). Low interest rates may have also favoured 
consumers' credit. On the other hand an income distribution favourable to high-incomes, high interest 
rates, high rents etc. may favour the diffusion of new luxurious consumers' goods. The marginal 
propensity to consume of the wealthiest, however, would remain lower than that of low and middle 
income classes. 
7 An innovation that does not affect the capital/output ratio is generally called 'Harrod neutral'. 
8 In the context of the European economy in the period over consideration it seems unlikely that technical 
change has had a clear capital-using bias (although we cannot be sure if it has been capital-saving or 
neutral). Therefore it is unlikely that induced investment has been stimulated in this way by technical 
progress but at the same time it is not clear that it has been affected negatively. According to the first 
Italian innovation survey for the period 1981-85, 65% of frrms declared that innovation implied a higher 
use of fixed capital, and only 4% a lower use. It is not clear, however, if this is true in value terms. The 
efficiency of computer based machinery has increased dramatically, bot at the same time their price has 
fallen. Better trained and more disciplined work-force may also have led to economies in investment 
expenditure through a more efficient exploitation of plants (Marsh, 1996). 
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9 In this regard, Lance Taylor quotes approvingly Pasinetti: 'Household happily dissave to switch to 
innovative products as they appear - how many staples of the 1990 advanced economy consumption 
baskets (VCR's, Fax machines, shopping centres, sushi bars) even existed ten years before? As Pasinetti 
(1981) emphasises the genius of capitalism resides in forestalling an unemployment crisis by inventing 
new products to replace old ones as demand for them subsides' (Taylor, 1991, p.15). 
10 The Schumpeterian view has been recently summarised by Prof. Chris Freeman: 'Whereas in neo-
classical theory the emphasis is on factor price flexibility and in keynesian theory on aggregate demand, 
with Schumpeter it is on autonomous investment, embodying new technical innovation which is the basis 
of economic development and new employment. In such framework economic growth must be viewed 
primarily as a process of reallocation of resources between industries and firms. That process necessarily 
leads to structural changes and disequilibrium if only because of the uneven rate of technical change 
between different industries and countries. Economic growth is not merely accompanied by fast growing 
new industries and the expansion of such industries; it primarily depends on that expansion. The new 
firms and new industries are an essential source of the new employment which compensates for the loss 
of jobs in declining industries and firms. It is a process of 'creative destruction' in which the process of 
job creation outstrips that of job destruction as a result of profound structural adjustment and not as a 
smooth incremental process' (Freeman, 1995, p.52). The subsequent passage shows how the OECD 
editors of the journal can easily embody Freeman's view in the mainstream ones: 'In general, economists 
have taken the view that technology ( ... ) may cause local and temporary unemployment, but it also causes 
demand to grow. If demand growth offsets productivity growth, and if wages are flexible downwards, 
then unemployment will not be a problem; within this type of approach, therefore, there is no general 
problem of unemployment as a result of technological change' (STI-Review, 1995, Introduction, p.ll) 
11 Taking inspiration from Kaldor they argue that a virtuous circle (or "cumulative causation") was then 
established between: 
(a) a positive relationship from aggregate demand growth to productivity growth ("productivity regime"), 
accompanied in tum by 
(b) a positive relationship from productivity growth to aggregate demand growth ("demand regime"). 
Increasing returns, based on the so-called 'Fordist model', and technical change would explain (a). The 
institutional set up favouring the translation of higher productivity in higher wages and consumption, 
and/or in more competitive exports would explain (b). See Petit (1995, p.21): 'productivity and demand 
are linked ... by a set of agreements or institutional arrangements tying elements of production organisation 
to elements of the formation of demand'. 
12 Note that we talk of government expenditure and not of government budget deficits. Keynesian 
policies are often confused with big deficits. As shown in simple terms by the well known 'Haavelmo 
theorem', an increase in government expenditure does not imply more internal deficit. 
13 Regulationists provide various explanations why the post-war 'accumulation regime' broke. The most 
characteristic, and least clear, refers to the 'breakdown of the Fordist model of production' when the well-
known Kaldor-Verdoon law ceased to operate (e.g. Boyer, 1988, p.240). Others have seen the cause of 
lower accumulation in the 'profit squeeze' caused by prolonged low unemployment rates and workers' 
high bargaining power in the 60s (Marglin, Schor, eds., 1990; see Petri, 1994). Interestingly enough, an 
econometric test run for 9 OECD countries has concluded that whereas the elasticity of productivity to 
demand has not changed significantly in recent years, it is demand that has ceased to match productivity 
gains (Pini, 1994). The deflationary macro-environment and the institutional set-up more favourable to 
profits would be the main explanation. From a more conventional theoretical perspective, also Svi 




Empirical evidence and policy prescriptions 
This chapter draws together the threads of the discussion to address the question of whether current 
problems of poor job creation are due to technical innovations. The policy implications of the conflicting 
views are compared. The evidence does not lend much support to the mainstream view of the 
effectiveness of labour market reforms. By contrast, macro-economic policies can be effective in curing 
high structural unemployment by sustaining final demand and investments. Increases in demand and 
employment are to be expected mainly in the service sector, provided conditions allow potential 
consumers to afford the (costly) services they need. Reductions in working time may contribute to 
increasing the number of jobs, but do not represent an alternative strategy to expansionary macro-
economic policies. 
The main conclusion of the previous chapters is that technical progress may cause 
persistent unemployment as there are no necessary endogenous 'compensation effects' 
either on the supply or demand side. Innovations, however, are not necessarily to blame 
since suitable economic policies can well compensate the negative effects of 
innovations, allowing their positive effects to increase the social welfare. 
An opposite view is held by mainstream economists, according to whom the market 
spontaneously brings about compensation effects on the supply side. Nonetheless, even 
in the mainstream view technical change may lead to unemployment as it may cause a 
temporary mismatch between demand and supply, raises that voluntary unemployment 
related to the search for the best opportunities, and finally may increase the 
unemployment related to the existence of various obstacles to the free operation of 
market forces. 
This chapter will look at some evidence to assess these conflicting thesis. 
3.1. Assessing the different interpretations 
The opening remark of the most recent influential institutional document on 
employment summarised its main conclusion, reflecting its mainstream views on the 
causes of unemployment: 
After having considered the available evidence and the various theories which 
have been advanced to explain today's unemployment, the basic conclusion was 
reached that it is an inability of OECD economies and societies to adapt rapidly 
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and innovatively to a world of rapid structural change that is the principal cause 
of high and persistent unemployment. (OECD's Jobs Study, 1994, p. vii). 
Various stylised facts, some of which were presented in that same Report, seem to 
disprove this view. 
First, comparison between the post-war phase of rapid economic growth and near full-
employment and the subsequent phase of high unemployment and slower growth shows 
that the change of 'regime' cannot be easily attributed to an intensification of innovation 
and structural change. The evidence shown in chapter 2 suggests that productivity has 
increased much less in 1970s and 1980s than in the 1960s (see also table 3.1 ). In 
addition, the analysis of other indicators measuring the changes in the employment 
share of different sectors of production also shows that structural change has been less 
intense in the recent phase. This leads the OECD's Jobs Study to conclude that: 
'virtually in all countries, turbulence in employment shares by sector during the 1980s 
either decreased or was stable compared to the 1970s. In the majority of countries for 
which data are available, industry shifts in employment during the 1980s were also 
much smaller than during the 1960s' (OECD, 1994, p. 16). 
Secondly, flexibility and competition in the labour market have increased since the late 
1970s, due to the policies followed in most industrialised countries (see also OECD, 
1994, pp 9; 19). 1 The two most active European countries in this direction, Spain and 
the UK, have not shown a good employment performance (Michie, Wilkinson, 1995). 
Although 'labour market flexibility' and' low wages might have stimulated employment 
in specific service sectors (by lowering the price of these services) or attracted foreign 
investment, little empirical evidence (let alone analytical proofs) has been provided as 
yet as to the effectiveness of these measures to support the growth of modem sectors. 
I e 
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Tab. 3.1 • Output, employment, productivity and labour force growth. 
1960-90. Annualised percentage rates of change. 
GOP* Employment 
1960s 1970s 1980s 1960s 1970s 
North America 4.4 2.8 2.6 2 2.3 
EC 4.8 3.3 2.1 0.2 0.4 
OECD 5.1 3.3 2.7 1.2 
Productivity Labour force 
1960s 1970s 1980s 1960s 1970s 
North America 2.3 0.5 0.8 1.8 2.6 
EC 4.6 2.9 1.7 0.2· 0.7 
OECD 4 2.1 1.5 0.9 1.4 
*Gross Domestic Product at 1985 prices and exchange rates. 










The fact that employment growth has been higher in the US than in Europe is very 
often invoked as an argument in support of the mainstream view that labour market 
flexibility favours job creation. However, other structural factors may explain the lower 
'4 
impact of income growth on employment in Europe compared with the US. In Europe 
the manufacturing sector, in which productivity growth is the fastest, has a larger share 
in output than in the US. In addition, Europe has constantly had higher rates of 
productivity growth in all sectors, and in particular in manufacturing (table 3.2). This 
was the case also in the sixties, when unemployment was higher in the US than in 
Europe. This suggests that the explanation may not lie in the alleged greater flexibility 
of the US labour market. A different explanation may be found in the persisting large 
productivity gap between Europe and the US (table 3.3). This gap indicates that while 
in the US technology is close to the 'frontier' of existing possibilities, and productivity 
gains may only be obtained through innovation, including organisational innovations at 
firm or industry level, in Europe technology is often backward, hence the pace of 
productivity growth is not limited by the availability of new, improved technologies, as 
large gains may be obtained simply by moving towards the already existing 'frontier' of 
technological and organisational possibilities. · The conclusion is that Europe needs 
much higher rates of income growth than the US to bring about the same job creation, 
the opposite of what has happened in recent years: between 1960 and 1970 income 
grew over 10 points more in Europe than in the US, but at similar percentages in the 
two later decades (table 3.4). 
The lack of evidence in support of an intensification of structural change or 
effectiveness of labour market reforms disproves the mainstream interpretation. Yet this 
view continues to be the background for the policy prescriptions by academic and 
official institutions2• 
In addition to the main conventional view, two other popular opinions should be 
recalled here. Albeit not necessarily stemming from the mainstream, neoclassical 
approach, they both attribute current high unemployment rates to factors other than the 
deflationary policies pursued in the last decades and the slow growth of the autonomous 
components of demand. 
' 
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Tab. 3.2 ·Sectoral annualised growth rates of productivity. Europe and US. 
1960-1990. 
1960 -68 1973 -79 1979 -90 
Europe us Europe us Europe us 
GDP/empl.s agrico1ture 5.3 3.6 4.3 1.1 3 5 
GDP/empl.s industry 4.6 2.5 2.4 -0.1 2.3 1.4 
GDP/empl.s services 2.9 2.3 1.5 0.2 0.6 0.4 
GDP/empl.s total 4.4 2.6 2.1 0.2 3 
Source: Oecd, Historical Statistics, 1960-1990. 
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Tab. 3.3 ·Sectoral per-capita GDP in Europe and US. Various years. 
(million of US$ at 1985 prices and exchange rates) 
1960 1968 1980 1987 
EUROPE 
Agricolture 3.22 4.47 5.94 6.07 
Industry 9.96 13.44 18.58 21.11 
Services 12.36 15.89 20.61 22.17 
UNTIED STATES 
Agricolture 13.32 18.25 26.26 24.96 
Industry 32.25 36.04 39.50 40.66 
Services 28.24 35.48 34.73 37.16 
Source: Oecd, National Accounts; Labour Statistics. 
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The first is the pessimistic view, quite popular on the mass-media that unemployment is 
the irreversible result of fast technical change. This is disproved by the positive 
association of output, employment and productivity growth during the 'golden age'. 
Also mainstream economists tend to reject this thesis. 3 
The second view points to the fact that, after all, at least up to the recent recession that 
began approximately in the early nineties, the rate of job creation in the OECD 
countries has not been disappointing compared to the sixties (see Dell'Aringa, 1995): 
table 3.4 shows that from 1960 to 1970 employment increased in Europe by 2.9% and 
in the US by 20.6% against 9.4 and 18.6, respectively, between 1980 and 1990. 
Accordingly, it is argued, the increase of labour supply and not the lack of job 
opportunities is mainly responsible for increasing unemployment, particularly in 
Europe4• By contrast, North America successfully absorbed much higher growth rates 
of labour supply for significantly longer periods of time (see table 3.1).5 
The increase of labour supply is certainly part of the European unemployment problem. 
However, the force of the argument that the pattern of job creation in Europe has been 
better in the recent past compared to the 60s is diminished once the decline of the 
agricultural sector that took place, particularly in continental Europe, during the sixties, 
is taken into account. Table 3.4 shows that in Europe over the decade 1960-70 the 
primary sector lost 11 millions jobs. This, set against a gain of over 15 million in the 
industrial and service sectors, reduced the net job creation to only 4 millions jobs. Still 
in the 70s Europe was loosing almost 6 million rural jobs. In Europe the growth rate of 
employment in the extra-agricultural sectors in the 60s was higher than in subsequent 
periods (14.5% in the '60s against 9.9% and 12.3% respectively in the 70s and 80s), in 
spite of higher productivity growth. In the US too the growth rate of employment (both 
total and extra-agricultural in this case) was higher in the 60s. 
Looking at the OECD countries as a whole, the major explanation of the employment 
performance is in output growth rates. Table 3.6 shows that consistent with our 
approach to the forces behind accumulation(§ 3), in the 1960s two major components 
of autonomous expenditure - exports and government expenditure in final consumption 
- were also growing at a faster rate than in the 70s. The 1980s witnessed a further 
marked decline in their growth rates6• 
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Tab. 3.4 ·Employment patterns in Europe and Nortb-America.1960-1990 
19 60 19 70 19 80 19 90 
Europe North Europe North Europe North Europe North 
America America America America 
ABSOLUTE EMPLOYMENT LEVELS 
Agricolture 37.6 6.3 26.5 4.2 20.7 4.1 18.8 3.9 
Industry 55.3 24.1 57.5 29.5 54.8 33.4 51.7 34.0 
Services 49.8 41.4 62.8 52.9 77.4 72.5 96.8 92.6 
Total 142.7 71.8 146.8 86.6 152.9 110.0 167.3 130.5 
ABSOLUTE VARIATIONS 
1960-70 1960-70 1970-80 1970-80 1980-90 1980-90 
Agricolture -1l.l -2.1 -5.8 -0.1 -1.9 -0.2 
Industry 2.2 5.4 -2.7 3.9 -3.1 0.6 
Services. 13 11.5 14.6 19.6 19.4 20.1 
Total 4.1 14.8 6.1 23.4 14.4 20.5 
Total extra-agric. 15.2 16.9 11.9 23.5 16.3 20.7 
PERCENTUAL VARIATIONS 
Agricolture -29.5 -33.3 -21.9 -2.4 -9.2 -4.9 
Industry 4.0 22.4 -4.7 13.2 -5.7 1.8 
Services 26.1 27.8 23.2 37.1 25.1 27.7 
Total 2.9 20.6 4.2 27.0 9.4 18.6 
Total extra-agric. 14.5 25.8 9.9 28.5 12.3 19.5 
Labour force 4.8 18.7 7.3 28.7 10.8 16.6 
GDP 59.0 46.7 33.8 32.9 26.1 28.2 
Source: Oecd, Labour force statistics, various years. 
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Tab. 3. 5 - Exports and Government expenditure in final consumption. 
Annual growth rates at 1990 prices and exchange rate. 
EXPORTS 
1960s 1970s 1980s 1990-93 
Oecd 11.5 7.9 6.0 4.1 
Oecd-Europe 11.2 7.0 5.6 3.5 
EC 11.4 7.1 5.6 3.3 
GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE IN FINAL CONSUMPTION 
1960s 1970s 1980s 1990-93 
Oecd 4.9 3.0 2.6 1.0 
Oecd-Europe 4.8 4.0 2.2 1.5 
EC 4.6 3.9 2.0 1.6 
Source: Oecd, National accounts. 
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3.2. Policy prescriptions 
3.2.1 The need for demand management policies 
From the above it can be concluded that an alleged intensification of technical 
innovation cannot be regarded as the cause of current high unemployment rates. The 
cause could be seen in the change in policy orientation in most industrial countries from 
full-employment objectives towards anti-inflationary objectives. In addition, the 
changed international environment has decreased individual countries ability to increase 
their export levels, and has made balance of payment constraints to expansionary 
policies more stringent. The target of monetary stability has also been the main 
consideration that has affected decisions concerning monetary unification in the EU, 
and the resulting deflationary stance of economic policies has become an issue of public 
concern in most European countries. 
According to the alternative view, macro-policies that affect the level of aggregate 
demand have not only cyclical but also persistent effects .. This is because aggregate 
demand affects the decisions to invest and hence the creation of productive capacity and 
the output level in subsequent periods. Structural unemployment in this view can be 
defined in a way very different from current mainstream definitions of the natural 
unemployment rate or NAIR.U. It is the unemployment level associated not to cyclical 
phenomena of underutilization of the existing productive capacity, but to a productive 
capacity which cannot - due to both its size and the techniques it incorporates - give 
employment to the entire labour force. Macro-policies can be effective in curing this 
structural unemployment in so far as by sustaining final demand they can stimulate 
higher investments and higher output growth 7. 
3.2.2. The role of services 
It is sometimes objected that higher growth rates of output, by stimulating higher 
productivity growth, would not in fact contribute much to employment creation. This 
requires some consideration of the sectors more likely to expand in a growing 
environment. There seems to be a general consensus as to the role of the service sector 
as the main source of future jobs in industrial economies (e.g. EC, 1993; OECD, 1994). 
In contrast, the manufacturing sector is not expected to supply much employment in the 
future given (a) the absence of major product innovations whose stimulus to 
consumption patterns is comparable, say, to the automobile or the domestic appliances; 
and (b) because of the higher productivity growth in manufacturing and competition 
from NIC's countries8. Nonetheless manufacture can still be an important source of 
jobs. Tables 3 and 4 show that the in spite of the continuous fall of its share of GDP, in 
47 
North America the manufacturing sector contributed in absolute terms to job creation, 
whereas the opposite happened in Europe.9 On the other side, many services may be the 
objects of wide organisational and technological reshuffling. With these caveats, it is 
still reasonable to maintain that it is the service sector that will contribute more to job 
creation. 
On the demand side an expansion of employment in this sector does not seem to meet 
limits other than the ability to pay of the potential consumers. To give an example, in 
many industrialised countries there will be a growing need of personal services (the 
least subject to productivity gains) from the elderly population. But the fact that most 
(low productivity) personal services are costly (Baumol, Bowen, 1965) might hinder 
their expansion. Three alternatives seem to be open at present to make possible an 
expansion of demand in this area. One is a larger social inequality in income 
distribution that would allow one part of the community to afford cheap personal 
services supplied by the other section. This is what often happens in developing 
countries and, possibly, in those industrial economies where labour market de-
regulation has gone most far. A second increasingly popular road is to develop a so-
called 'third' or 'non-profit' sector (see prof.G.Lunghini and other contributions in 
Politica ed Economia, 1995; Rifkin, 1995) that would provide affordable service on the 
basis of a self-restrained wage policy on the part of the employees (plus donations by 
the private sector, voluntary work and tax relief and subsidies by the State). The third 
traditional road is the public supply of services in which the State acts as direct 
employer and subsidises the supply of services by income re-distribution through the 
tax system. 
The first route is evidently open to objections on the ground of social acceptability, and 
might not in the long-run be really viable in advanced, democratic countries. The 
second one, it might be feared, could pull together the drawbacks of both the first (as it 
implies underpaid workers) and the third (as it receives public subsidies). As far as most 
of the personal services are concerned (including education, health, assistance to the 
elderly), it is indeed possible, as shown by the past positive experiences of many 
European countries, that the third system is the most efficient road (see Prof. 
\ 
A.Graziani in Politica ed Economia, 1995)10• 
3.2.3 Reduction in working time 
Another popular but little investigated employment policy relies on the reduction of 
working-time. It is not easy to draw general trends for different periods and countries 
given the changing nature of jobs, e.g. the diffusion of part-time jobs and multiple 
jobholding, rates of absenteeism, overtime, different holidays etc. (Bosch et al, 1994). 
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The general opinion is that the long-period trend has been of a reduction of the working 
hours (e.g. Maddison, 1991, p.137), although the opposite has been true for the early 
stages of capitalism before the reduction became an objective of organised labour. 
According to Maddison's figures (ibid., table 5.3), the reduction in selected industrial 
countries has been, if anything, less substantial during the 'golden age' 1950-73 
compared to other periods. This is interesting since it shows that it was mostly the high 
rates of growth that compensated for productivity gains, and not the reduction in 
working hours, although the latter also played a role. Reductions after this period may 
have become more substantial due to labour-share schemes and, more importantly, for 
the diffusion of part-time jobs. It should be noted that the diffusion of part-time jobs has 
much more to do with the policies of 'flexibilisation' of labour markets than with the 
target of reducing working-time and increasing the number of employed people (Bosch 
et al., 1994, p.43). In addition, official figures for the Unites States quoted by Schor 
( 1988) show that the annual per-capita worked hours in the manufacturing sector 
remained substantially constant from 1949 till 1985 -slightly declining from 1,976 in 
1949 to 1924 in 1980, and up again to 1949 in 1985. Multiple jobholding and the fall of 
absenteeism in recent years would be part of the explanation. In European countries the 
reduction may have been more substantial (Bosch et al, table 2), less so in northern 
countries where the target of full employment by other means during the eighties made 
this a secondary objective. It can be argued that the reduction of working-time is a long-
period process, which is eased, if anything, by output, employment and productivity 
growth and, therefore, it should not be taken as a substitute - but rather as a 
complementary policy - to more traditional full-employment policies. 
3.2.4. Education, training and research 
A general consensus between opposite theoretical persuasions is more easily found with 
regard to supply-side policies devoted to education, re-training, R&D and the like. In 
the first place, however, deflationary policies generally have led to cuts in the public 
expenditure in these sectors. In addition, analytical and empirical considerations 
suggest that supply-side policies are more effective in an expansionary environment 
which favours a rapid economic application of, say, training and research. Whatever 
training you provide people with, it will be of little use if the jobs simply are not there 
(for an orthodox sceptical view of training see, e.g., The Economist, April 1996). 
Footnotes 
1 The OECD's Jobs Study is thus led to admit that: 'despite considerable effort, it has been hard to identify 
changes in the basic structural determinants of the natural unemployment rate that are large enough to 




2 See the critical comments by J.G.Smith (1994) on Mr.J.Delors' 'White Paper on Unemployment' (EC, 
1993). 
3 Looking at the same data presented here in table 3.1, a leading Italian labour economist concludes: 'The 
figures do not lend support to the idea, often claimed, that economic development in the last decades has 
mainly brought about increases in labour productivity while proving very poor in job creation. ( ... ) In 
analytical terms we may say that the elasticity of employment with respect to output has increased (and 
not decreased) over time' (Dell'Aringa, 1995). On the same vein, noticing the similar rates of job creation 
over the 60s and 80s, Glyn argues that since output growth has not been higher over the last decade 
(26.1% in Europe against 59% in the 60s ... ), then productivity growth has declined and it would be 
"absolutely wrong ... to blame technology from 'destroying jobs"' (Glyn, 1995, p.3). 
4 The Jobs Study does not seem to share this view (OECD, 1994, p.l). 
5 It may appear odd that mainstream economists seem to attribute to labour supply growth at the same 
time the high job creation in the US and the high unemployment in Europe. The rationale is in the alleged 
higher flexibility of the US labour market that, unlike the European, would have permitted employment 
creation to match the increase in labour supply. 
6 The OECD's Jobs Study discusses the possibility of using fiscal policy to expand the economy. The 
Report, notices with embarrassment that expansionary fiscal policies in the eighties were associated with 
a reduction in budget deficits (given 'buoyant tax revenues', p.65), which worsened precisely once less 
expansionary policies took place. It also argue that "[a]lthough the current recession was in part induced 
by policies aimed at correcting the earlier excessively loose and unbalanced policy stance in 1987-89, 
which had led to overheating in many OECD countries, it has also been more prolonged than expected so 
that 'overcorrection' has occurred", and concludes that there currently is a 'deficiency of demand' (p.66). 
In spite of the recognition that the lack of expansionary fiscal and monetary policies are the roots of high 
unemployment, their effectiveness is later denied with the basic argument that they would lead to higher 
inflation. · 
7 Inflation is n~t a necessary consequence of expansionary policies, although it may result from a 
pressure to raise real wages when a fall in the unemployment rate is experienced, or from rising 
commodity prices following a general expansion in industrial countries. These, however, could be faced 
not by means of deflationary policies restoring high unemployment, but by means of income policies 
attempting to find a social consensus over income distribution. Income policies would be favoured by the 
productivity gains also associated to the faster output growth. From an institutional point of view, it 
should be recognised that an effective income policy would require stronger and not weaker centralised 
trade-unions. 
8 According to some commentators (e.g. Wood, 1994), European countries are 'exporting' jobs to the 
cheap labour-costs NIC's countries. It is likely that Europe is losing low-skilled manufacturing jobs in 
favour of NIC's countries. This could, however be compensated by the increase of low-skilled jobs in the 
service sector (jobs that by their very nature are difficult to export and that are badly needed by the 
European population). And the reason why the service sector low skill jobs have grown so slowly seems 
to be precisely that Effective demand in Europe has been growing too slowly. 
9 Note that the development of many services (financial, transport and communication, etc.) depends on 
the trends of the manufacturing sector. 
10 Most of the successful job creation in EFTA countries in the 80s has consisted of government jobs. Far 
from being considered as artificial jobs creation, the latter should be viewed as part of the long-run 
expansion of the service sector. Citizens may in many cases be ready to pay more, as tax payers and as 
consumers, for more reliable services (Meadows, 1996). 
Cesaratto-Eims 50 May 10,1996 
Chapter4 
Implications for the analysis of CIS data: from micro to macro 
This chapter links the general discussion carried out at the macro level in chapters 1, 2 and 3, to the 
micro-economic analysis of CIS data developed in the subsequent chapters. The difficulties of tracing the 
macro-economic implications of micro-economic behaviour are put forward. We conclude that from the 
analysis of data at enterprise level important results can be obtained concerning the technological 
specialisation of a country and the composition, by sector, firms' size and skill, of employment. In the 
case of the export performance, some macro-economic implications mav be drawn. 
By looking at CIS data we expect two order of results to become apparent: 
(A) at the micro-economic level we want to assess and compare the employment and 
economic performance of different typologies of firms assessing, in addition, the impact 
of specific innovation related variables. 
(B) at the macro-economic level we wish to draw some conclusions as to the overall 
impact of innovation on employment. 
In principle, the first objective does not present particular obstacles. On the contrary, 
the second objective meets serious difficulties that we explore in this chapter. 
4.1. Displacement effects 
Recall that from the analysis presented in previous chapters we concluded that 
technological unemployment is in principle a possibility. We rejected the neoclassical 
compensation effects on the supply side but allowed for the existence of compensation 
effects on the demand side, either through the positive effects of innovations on gross 
investment and consumption and/or through policy intervention. 
Looking at the manufacturing sector first, an single firm/industry can affect the output 
and employment levels of the economy either by directly expanding its production, or 
indirectly by increasing its demand for production goods from other firms/industries 
(e.g. investment goods). In either case it cannot safely conclude that the direct and 
indirect effects are a net outcomes since in principle, the displacement of competing 
firms or industries cannot be ruled out. In other words, the growth ,of one firm/industry 
may be accompanied by the decline of a competing firm/industry. 
Looking at the economy as a whole, output and income growth in the manufacturing 
sector, although they may be associated to a decline of employment (as a consequence 
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of productivity growth), may generate output and employment growth in the service 
sector. 
As a conclusion, output and employment patterns of innovating firms have not clear net 
effects on the manufacturing sector and the economy as a whole. 
4.2. The impact on investment, consumption and exports 
The arguments presented above(§ 2.3 and appendix 2) also show that one cannot safely 
argue that innovation pushes gross investment over the level that would have been 
established in the absence of innovations. 
Given some favourable circumstances, however, product innovation may positively 
affect consumption levels, but, unfortunately, to assess this is out of the scope of our 
research (although we shall look at the different impact at firm level of product versus 
process innovations). 
From chapter 2, we also concluded that in the case of exports more reliable conclusions 
can be drawn as to the positive effects of innovation on overall employment. Although, 
. 
once again, at the level of the individual firm export growth may well lead to lower 
employment (since in principle productivity growth may overcome output growth), at 
the aggregate level the effects of exports on overall output and employment can be 
safely taken as positive. 
4.3. Measuring the macro-impact of innovation on employment from micro-data: 
conclusions 
All this considered, we may conclude that albeit interesting to investigate the different 
sales, employment, investment and innovation typology of innovating firms, and to 
compare these to 'control groups' (e.g. non-innovating units), much caution has to be 
observed in drawing macro-economic conclusions. 
The comparison of the economic performance of firms with different innovation 
patterns is, of course, an important indication of the processes of structural change 
occurring in the economy, and as such it provides important information, e.g. for 
innovation policy. Information on employment· mainly concerns the composition of 
employment, e.g. by firms' size, sector and skills, but not its level.. 
Some reliable macro-economic conclusions can, however, be drawn on the basis of the 
export performance of innovating units. 
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PART II 
The impact of innovation on employment in Italy: results from 
Community innovation survey 1990-1992. 
PART ll investigates the impact of innovation on employment in the Italian 
manufacturing sector on the basis of the Community Innovation Survey (CIS) for the 
years 1990-1992. 
Chapter 5 compares the performance of a sample of almost 6,000 Italian innovating 
firms to that of a sample of over 9, 000 non-innovating firms and to a larger panel of 
over 26,000 firms. The latter is representative of the employment and economic 
performance of all the Italian firms with more than 20 employees. The results of some 
simple regression analysis are also presented. 
Chapter 6 compares the performance of different types of innovative behaviour. Factor 
analysis and cluster analysis are used in this chapter. It also evaluates, by using 
discriminant analysis, the impact of different innovation-variables on the performance 
of innovating firms. 
Methodological discussion and more technical results are reported in the appendices 3, 
4 and 5. 
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Chapter 5. 
Comparison of the employment performance of innovating, non innovating and 
all manufacturing firms 
This chapter compares the employment and economic performance of innovating firms 
to that of non-innovating firms and to a panel representing all manufacturing firms with 
more than 20 employees. It emerges that innovating firms do not perform better in 
terms of employment and output, with the exception of small innovating firms. 
However, innovating firms have an important role in exports. This role has increased 
over the years 1990-92 compensating their difficulties in the domestic market. It can be 
concluded that, over the period 1990-92, although the direct impact of innovation on 
employment has not been positive, the indirect one through exports has been beneficial. 
Jn addition, investment related to the introduction of innovations may have softened the 
negative impact of the recession on the overall level of gross investment. Regression 
analysis confirms these results. However, it suggests some caution with regard to the 
I positive effect of innovation on exports at the firm level. 
We begin by comparing the employment and economic performance of three panels of 
firms over the period 1989-1992: (i) almost 6,000 innovating firms (IF), (ii) over 9,000 
non-innovating units (NIF), both surveyed by CIS, and (iii) over 26,000 firms covered 
by the Survey on the economic results of firms with more than 20 employees (SERF). 
The latter panel includes the first two samples of IF and NIF. SERF has been useful not 
only as a control group, but also because it integrated the information available from 
CIS with data on employment and other economic variables. 
The reader is strongly advised to read appendix 3 first, where the limitations of the data sets are 
illustrated. In short, one should recall that: 
(i) the employment figures are gross of 'temporary lay-offs' ('Cassa integrazione guadagni' or wage-
supplementary fund) 1, so it tends to underestimate the real variations in employment; 
{ii) total hours worked concern only blue-collars and include over-time. One should also keep in mind 
that the data are based on closed panels that do not take into account variations due to firms' births and 
deaths. 
In this chapter, the statistical tables provide information according to: 
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(i) a classification of sectors between those where firms that carry out R&D activities 
prevail, and those where this is not the case; the two classes are defined R&D-oriented 
and non R&D-oriented2• This classification has been adopted to facilitate the 
illustration of the tables. 
(ii) firms size, based on the class of employees firms belonged to in 1989. 
The composition of the three panels of firms are shown in table 5.1. As expected, the 
set of IF comprises a larger share of R&D-oriented sectors and of medium and large 
firms. Nonetheless, over 5,000 firms with less than 200 employees are present among 
IF. 
The direct impact of innovation on employment, hours worked, value-added and 
productivity over the period 1990-92 are illustrated first. The indirect impact on 
employment through the effects on exports and investment are described next. 
Subsequently, the impact on the output and labour-force composition is examined. 
Finally, the results of some simple regression analyses are illustrated. 3 
5.1. Impact of innovation on employment, hours worked, value-added and 
productivity growth 
Main findings 
Over the period 1990-92, IF performed better than NIF and SERF in terms of 
number of employees, but not~in term of total hours worked and output. Various 
considerations lead us to believe that hours worked is a better indicator. It may be 
concluded that over this period the IF do not show a better employment 
performance than NIF and SERF. Small IF are the exception doing better than 
any other group both in terms of number of employees and of hours worked. 
Both indicators (employment and hours worked) show a fall in the use of labour-
inputs for IF that innovated only in processes or only in products. Figures on 
gross job tum-over show that the process of creation and destruction of jobs has 
not been higher among IF. The growth rate of value added of IF has been lower 
than the average. The productivity level of IF is higher that the other groups. Over 
the same period, small IF (but also small firms in the other groups) have reduced 
their productivity-gap with respect to the average level. Over the period per-
worked hour productivity growth of IF has been slightly higher than in the other 
groups. This is the result of a low growth rate of value added associated to a 
significant reduction of hours worked. 
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Tab. 5.1- Distribution of panels of firms by sector and size (1) in 1989. 
INNOVATING FIRMS NON INNOVATING FIRMS SERF 
n. % n. % n. % 
Total 5962 100.0 9534 100.0 26642 100.0 
Non R&D-oriented 3225 54.1 7103 74.5 17912 67.2 
sectors 
R&D-oriented 2737 45.9 2431 25.5 8730 42.8 
sectors 
20-199 5102 85.6 9315 97.7 24819 93.2 
200-499 530 8.9 189 2.0 1274 4.8 
Over 500 330 5.5 30 0.3 549 2.1 
Note: (1) All innovating firms and non innovating firms encompassed by the Community Innovation Survey are included 
in the Survey on the economic results offrrms (lndagine sui prodotto lordo) (see appendix 3). 
Legenda: 
R&D-oriented sectors: 
Chemicals; Synthetic fibres; Machinery; Electronics, computers; Car industry; Other transports; 
Scientific instruments; Plastic & rubber. 
Non R&D-oriented sectors: 
Metal minerals mining; Metallurgy; Non metal.minerals mining; Non metal.minerals processing; 
Metal products; Basic food industry; Food & drinks; Textiles; Leather, Clothing & footwear; 
Wood & furniture; Paper & printing; Misc.other manufacture. 
Source: !stat, CIS, SERF. 
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Tab.S.2 • Annual rates of growth of employment in IF, NIF 
and SERF by sector and size (1). 1990-92. 
(percentages [2]) 
1990 1991 1992 1990-92 
INNOVATING Total 2.26 3.04 -4.04 0.28 
FIRMS 
Non R&D-oriented 1.75 0.80 -2.87 -0.09 
sectors 
R&D-oriented 2.55 4.31 -4.68 0.49 
sectors 
SIZE 20-199 4.86 1.54 0.78 1.83 
200-499 2.10 -0.29 -1.42 0.09 
Over500 1.10 4.59 -6.90 -0.39 
TYPE OF Both prod.&proc. 2.69 3.86 -4.56 0.45 
INNOVATION 
Onlyproc. 0.16 -0.37 -1.37 -0.39 
Only prod. 1.38 0.66 -2.83 -0.21 
NON INNOVATING Total 1.74 -0.66 -2.38 -0.45 
FIRMS 
Non R&D-oriented 1.53 -0.70 -2.37 -0.52 
sectors 
R&D-oriented 2.33 -0.56 -2.40 -0.23 
sectors 
SIZE 20-199 2.29 -0.44 -2.08 -0.09 
200-499 -0.45 -1.79 -4.51 -2.21 
Over500 -2.91 -2.03 -3.18 -2.63 
SERF Total 1.67 1.19 -3.12 -0.11 
Non R&D-oriented 1.25 -0.18 -2.18 -0.38 
sectors 
R&D-oriented 2.15 2.70 -4.14 0.19 
sectors 
SIZE 20-199 3.22 0.35 -0.50 1.03 
200-499 0.97 -0.60 -2.72 -0.79 
OverSOO -0.18 3.13 -6.93 -1.40 
NATIONAL 0.50 -2.20 -4.30 -2.00 
ACCOUNTS (3) 
Legenda: see table l. 
Notes: 
( 1) Employment is gross of temporary 'lay-offs'. 
(2) In this and in the following tables, the value for 1990-92 or 1989-92 are simple averages. 
(3) Annual growth rates of number of employees in the manufacturing sector in equivalent full time 
Source: !STAT, CIS, SERF. 
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Tab. 5.3 • Annual rates or growth or hours worked in IF, NIF 
and SERF by sector and size (1) • 1989-92. 
(percentages [2]) 
1990 1991 1992 1990-92 
INNOVATING Total -0.57 -0.06 -4.33 -1.64 
FIRMS 
Non R&D-oriented 1.35 -1.52 -2.18 -0.79 
sectors 
R&D-oriented -1.86 0.95 -5.77 -2.22 
sectors 
SIZE 20-199 2.83 0.00 -0.91 0.63 
200-499 -0.57 -2.97 -1.45 -1.64 
Over 500 -2.42 0.69 -7.02 -2.88 
TYPE OF Both prod.&proc. -0.99 1.01 -4.68 -1.56 
INNOVATION 
Only proc. 1.24 -2.86 -1.67 -l.lO 
On1yprod. 0.51 -4.65 -4.53 -2.84 
NON INNOVATING Total 1.10 -1.43 -3.64 -1.32 
FIRMS 
Non R&D-oriented 0.83 -1.18 -3.17 -1.17 
sectors 
R&D-oriented 1.89 -2.16 -5.04 -1.77 
.sectors 
SIZE 20-199 1.66 -1.40 -3.93 -1.23 
200-499 -1.97 -1.83 -1.60 -1.77 
Over 500 -2.70 -1.04 -2.48 -2.03 
SERF Total -0.41 -0.60 -3.70 -0.41 
Non R&D-oriented 0.32 -0.92 -2.46 -0.27 
sectors 
R&D-oriented -1.38 -0.17 -5.35 -0.59 
sectors 
SIZE 20-199 1.86 -0.87 -2.11 -0.23 
200-499 -0.83 -2.04 -2.63 -0.29 
Over 500 -3.99 0.55 -6.94 -0.77 
NATIONAL 0.50 -2.20 -4.30 -2.00 
ACCOUNTS (3) 
Legenda: see table 1. 
Notes: 
(l) Only 'blue collars'. 
(2) 1990-92: simple average. 
(3) Annual growth rates of number of employees in the manufacturing sector in equivalent full time 
Source: !STAT, CIS, SERF 
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Details 
Employment and total hours worked 
Over the period 1990-924, the average annual growth rate of employment of IF was 
0.28% against -0.45% and -0.11% of NIF and SERF, respectively (fig. 5.1 and table 
5.2). By contrast, the average annual growth rate of total hours worked of IF was -











Fig.5.1 -Average annual rates of growth 
of employment and hours worked over 
1990-92. 
lJLJ LJ LJ small IF SERF small NIF 
IF NIF 
• Employment 0 Worked-hours 
small SERF 
The results of IF in terms of employment and hours worked change rates are clearly 
divergent. 
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The divergence is more apparent among IF and SERF in the years 1990 and 1991. In 
NIF, and in 1992 for all firms, the two indicators move together. The divergence is 
analysed in Appendix 4. It appears that in 1990 and· 1991 the divergence in IF and 
SERF may be caused by some (the minority) of the firms increasing employment and 
hours worked, and the rest (the majority) laying-off workers and reducing hours 
worked. The reduction of hours worked by the second group was larger than the 
increase in the former, and this produced the negative sign for hours worked in 1990 
and 1991. However, since our data do not take into account lay-offs, at least part of the 
reduction of employment by the second group is not shown in the data, and hence the 
positive sign prevails. We have also considered the possibility that the divergence can 
be explained by a substitution of white-collar workers for blue-collar workers. This 
process may have played some role especially among small firms where, however, 
white-collar workers are a less significant share of total employment. All this 
considered, hours worked appear to be a better indicator of the net variations in the use 
of 'labour-inputs'. This indicator is only a proxy for the variation of the number of 
employees, as it concerns only blue-collars and it includes variations in over-time. 
Tables 5.2 and 5.3. show that among IF and SERF the R&D-oriented sectors do better 
than the non R&D-oriented sectors in terms of number of employees, but not in terms 
of hours worked. On both criteria, there is not much difference among NIF5. 
Looking at product and process innovations, we also have a mixed picture. IF that 
innovated either only in processes or only in products reduced both the number of 
employees and the hours worked (the average annual growth rates in the former group 
are -0.39% and -1.10%, respectively; and -0.21% and -2.84%, respectively, in the 
second group). IF that introduced both product and process innovations increased the 
number of employees, but reduced hours worked (0.45% and -1.56%, respectively). 
These data show that while process innovations do not favour a greater use of labour-
inputs, it is not clear whether more favourable result can be expected from product 
innovations. To this regard, it should be noted that the negative impact of process 
innovations on the use of labour-inputs may be faster than the positive impact of 
product innovations, especially when a recession is approaching. A similar result 
regarding the negative impact of process innovations on employment is also obtained in 
Ch.6 below, using a different methodology. 
Interesting enough, from the viewpoint of firm size, the two labour-input indicators 
provide more consistent results. In particular, both indicators, though to a different 
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degree, show that the average growth rates of employment and hours worked in small 
IF were 1.83% and 0.63%, respectively (see fig.5.1 ). Small firms do better than 
medium and large firms also among NIF and SERF, although only small IF show a 
positive value for both indicators. Only in 1992 small IF started to reduce hours worked 
while still showing a positive (gross) employment growth. 
Gross job tum-over 
In dealing with the divergence between average (gross) employment and hours worked 
figures, we have implicitly pointed to the underlying variety of behaviour at the firm 
level, with part of them expanding the use of labour-inputs, and others reducing it. 
Gross job creation and destruction, gross job tum-over for short, has attracted much 
attention in recent years as a measure of structural change (OECD, 1995). Small annual 
net changes in employment may be accompanied by large gross changes that result 
from the addition of the gross creation of new positions (expansions) and the gross 
destruction of existing positions (contractions). The values of gross job tum-over 
displayed in table 5.4 under-estimate the actual figures, sin~e they are gross of lay-offs, 
do not take into account births and deaths of firms, and are limited to firms with more 
than 20 employees (gross jobs tum-over is usually higher in small firms)6. The table 
shows that the positive performance of -IF in terms of employment results from the 
majority of firms having increased the number of employees (52.2% ). Conversely, only 
a minority of firms ( 46.2%) were increasing hours worked. 
The lack of labour market flexibility is seen by mainstream economists as an obstacle 
to structural change (see above chapter 3). While the results concerning gross job tum-
over do not permit the rejection of the hypothesis that labour market rigidities have 
discouraged more structural change in the Italian manufacturing sector over the years 
1990-92, they show that, ceteris paribus, IF have not seen greater structural change in 
terms of job tum-over this period compared to the other groups. Therefore, 
'technological shocks' cannot be easily advocated as a source of labour market 
maladjustment requiring more flexibility. Moreover, the figures are roughly in line with 
those obtained for economies where the labour market is considered more 'flexible'7• 
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Tab. 5.4 • Gross job tum-over (1) and share of firms increasing employment and hours worked 
in IF, NIF and SERF by sector and size.1989-92 
(percentages) 
JOB TURN OVER % that in 1990-92 increased 
1990 1991 1992 Employment Hours worked 
INNOVATING Total 12.4 18.9 11.7 52.2 46.2 
FIRMS 
Non R&D-oriented 13.7 11.7 13.7 52.0 48.9 
sectors 
R&D-oriented 11.6 23.2 10.7 52.4 43.1 
sectors 
20-199 13.6 9.4 13.4 54.3 48.4 
200-499 ~ 16.3 8.0 13.9 41.3 35.3 
Over500 10.4 28.3 9.4 36.7 30.6 
NON INNOVATING Total 12.8 7.9 12.1 43.6 42.8 
FIRMS 
Non R&D-oriented 12.8 7.7 11.7 42.8 42.7 
sectors 
R&D-oriented 12.5 8.3 13.2 46.1 42.9 
sectors 
20-199 12.5 7.9 12.2 44.0 43.0 
200-499 14.3 6.6 13.4 28.0 37.0 
Over 500 IO.l 10.6 7.4 23.3 26.7 
SERF Total 13.7 13.2 12.9 45.2 44.5 
Non R&D-oriented 14.3 8.4 13.4 43.9 45.1 
sectors 
R&D-oriented 13.0 18.4 12.4 47.9 43.3 
sectors 
20-199 14.0 7.3 13.8 45.9 45.2 
200-499 15.0 7.6 15.6 37.8 36.6 
Over500 12.0 26.2 9.4 34.2 29.9 
Note: (1) Gross job tum-over is the sum of the positive and negative increments of employment, 
the negative variation taken in absolute value. 
Source: ISTAT, CIS, SERF. 
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Value added and productivity 
IF display an higher level of productivity (measured by per-capita or per-worked hour 
productivity) than the other two groups (table 5.5). This shows that the Italian CIS has 
discriminated quite well between innovating, high-productivity and non-innovating, 
low productivity firms. Other results show that the productivity-gap between small and 
large IF has shrunk over the period. For instance, per-hour worked productivity in small 
IF rose from 78.3% of the average level in 1989 to 83.3% in 1992. The same is true in 
terms of per-capita productivity and for the other two panels of firms. 
The rates of growth of value-added in real terms (table 5.6) show that, over the period 
1990-92, the performance of IF was the same of NIF and worse performance than 
SERF firms (the rates were 1.9% in IF and NIF, and 2.6% in SERF). The exception are 
the small IF that grew more than any other class of firms (the annual growth rates for 
small firms in the three groups are 6.3%, 2.5% and 4.6%, respectively). 
Over the period, the average annual productivity growth rates8 of IF, calculated as the 
variations of real value added/total hours worked (table 5.6), have been slightly greater 
compared to NIF and SERF (3.5%, 3.2% and 3.1% in the three groups, respectively). In 
terms of per-capita productivity the situation is reversed, with IF showing lower 
productivity growth. However, as explained above, figures based on number of 
employees are less reliable since they include lay-offs. Small IF show the highest rates 
of productivity growth on the basis of both indicators. 
5.2. Impact of innovation on exports and investment 
Main fmdings 
Over half of Italian exports come from IF. Over the period, they have shown 
higher growth rates of exports and widened their share o( total exports. Small IF 
have shown the largest growth rates, but still play a secondary role in total exports 
with small NIF and other small firms playing a more significant role. 
The share of investment in value-added and the growth rates of investment are 
relatively higher in IF. Investment growth rates have been higher as an average 
over the period, and it has reacted less negatively to the recession . 
• 
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Tab. 5.5 ·Productivity levels (1) in IF, NIF and SERF by sector and size.1992. 
INNOVATING FIRMS NON INNOVATING FIRMS SERF 
Per-hour Per-capita Per-hour Per-capita Per-hour Per-capita 
worked worked worked 
Total 75.4 77.1 48.2 59.3 65.4 71.9 
Non R&D-oriented 65.2 77.7 45.9 57.7 56.2 68.1 
sectors 
R&D-oriented 82.6 77.5 55.3 63.7 78.1 76.1 
sectors 
20-199 62.8 72.5 47.4 58.6 54.7 65.2 
200-499 76.9 80.2 52.9 63.9 71.8 77.6 
Over 500 82.6 79.3 53.1 61.5 81.9 79.4 
Note: (1) Per hours worked: value-added on number hours worked (thausands of Italian liras); 
Per-capita: value-added on numberof gross employees (millions of Italian liras). 
Source: ISTAT, CIS, SERF. 
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Tab. 5.6 • Annual rates of growth of value-added in real terms and productivity 
in IF, NIF and SERF by sector and size (1).1990-92. 
(percentages) 
Value -added Per-capita Per-hour worked 
productivity productivity 
,! 
INNOVATING Total 1.87 1.59 3.51 
FIRMS •l 
Non R&D-oriented 2.46 2.55 3.25 
sectors 
R&D-oriented 1.55 1.06 3.76 
sectors 
20-199 6.30 4.47 5.67 
200-499 4.40 4.31 6.04 
Over 500 -0.35 0.04 2.53 
NON INNOVATING Total 1.89 2.34 3.21 
FIRMS 
Non R&D-oriented 2.56 3.09 3.74 
sectors 
R&D-oriented 1.52 1.75 3.29 
sectors 
20-199 2.46 2.56 3.70 
200-499 0.64 2.86 2.41 
Over500 -3.59 -0.96 -1.56 
SERF Total 2.58 2.69 3.10 
Non R&D-oriented 2.93 3.31 3.58 
sectors 
R&D-oriented 2.24 2.05 2.64 
sectors 
20-199 4.55 3.53 3.76 
200-499 3.86 4.65 4.94 
Over500 0.03 1.42 2.19 
NATIONAL ACCOUNT: 0.63 2.63 na 
ACCOUNTS (2) 
Legenda: see table 1. 
Note: 
(1) Productivity growth is calculated as the difference between the growth rates of value-added 
and those of employment and total hours worked, respectively. 
(2) Manufacturing sector. 




The share of exports in total sales (table 5.7) for IF is higher compared to the other two 
groups (the average values are 26%, 21% and 23% in the three groups, respectively, 
over the period 1989-92). The propensity to export of R&D-oriented sectors is larger 
than non R&D-oriented sectors both in the IF and SERF. The share of exports in total 
sales increases with firm size in the IF and SERF groups. In all groups the export share 
has increased over the period (from 25% to 27% in IF). 
Export growth in real terms (fig 5.2 and table 5.7) has been higher in IF (the average 
annual rate have been 4.8% in IF, against 3.2% and 3.9% in NIF and SERF, 
respectively). Among IF, the highest growth rates are shown by non R&D-oriented 
firms (8.4%) and small firms (9.3%). 
Let us now look at how exports from each of the three panels are distributed according 
to different classes of firms (fig.5.3 and table 5.8). Among IF, the R&D-oriented sectors 
and large firms have the largest export shares (73% and 61% respectively). The 
opposite is true for NIF, with non R&D-oriented sectors and small firms having the 
largest shares (67% and 82%, respectively). SERF, which is representative of the 
overall distribution of the Italian manufacturing sector, shows that the R&D-oriented 
sectors have the largest share of exports (58% against 41% of the non R&D-oriented 
industries). Interestingly, the weight of large firms precisely matches that of small 
firms, with both slightly over 40% of total exports. Comparing the structure of exports 
in 1989 and 1992, it can be appreciated that in all three group the share of small firms 













Fig.5.2- Average rates of growth of 
exports over 1990-92. 
IF NIF SERF 
Table 5.9 provides additional information on how important are IF in the structure of 
Italian exports. Column (a) shows the share of IF in total exports for each class. As an 
average over the period 1989-92, 53% of total exports comes from IF (the share 
increased from 52% in 1989 to 54% in 1992). The share of exports of IF is the highest 
in the R&D-oriented sectors and among large firms (67% and 79%, respectively, of 
total exports in each of these classes). It is lower among the non R&D-oriented sectors 
and small firms (34% and 30% ). Column (b) shows the share of total exports (from all 
types of firms) covered by each class of IF. The 53% of total exports that come from IF 
is made of 14% from non R&D-oriented sectors and 39% from R&D-oriented sectors. 
It also results from 13% of total exports coming from small IF, 8% from medium IF 
and 32% from large IF. By way of comparison, column (c) shows the share of total 
value-added of each class of IF. R&D-oriented sectors and large firms display a larger 




Tab.S. 7 • Share of exports on sales and rates of growth of exports (in real terms) 
in IF, NIF and SERF by sector and size. 1989·92. 
EXPORTS/SALES %average 
growth rates 
1989 1992 1989-92 1990-92 
INNOVATING Total 0.25 0.27 0.26 4.81 
FIRMS 
Non R&D-oriented 0.17 0.18 0.17 8.39 
sectors 
R&D-oriented 0.30 0.32 0.31 3.55 
sectors 
20-199 0.23 0.25 0.24 9.27 
200-499 0.28 0.28 0.27 5.58 
Over 500 0.25 0.27 0.26 3.03 
NON INNOVATING Total 0.21 0.22 0.21 3.21 
FIRMS 
Non R&D-oriented 0.19 0.20 0.20 3.98 
sectors 
R&D-oriented 0.27 0.27 0.27 1.63 
sectors 
20-199 0.21 0.22 0.21 4.25 
200-499 0.24 0.23 0.24 -0.13 
Over500 0.23 0.21 0.23 -3.61 
SERF Total 0.23 0.24 0.23 3.90 
Non R&D-oriented 0.18 0.19 0.18 5.40 
sectors 
R&D-oriented 0.29 0.30 0.29 2.83 
sectors 
20-199 0.21 0.23 0.22 6.67 
200-499 0.25 0.25 0.25 2.85 
Over 500 0.25 0.26 0.25 1.64 
NATIONAL 3.40 
ACCOUNTS (1) 
Legenda: see table 1. 
Note: (1) Manufacturing sector. 
Source: ISTAT, CIS, SERF 
------------ - -----------.. 
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\. 
Fig.5.3 - Distribution of 
exports by firms• size over 1989-92. 








41 .40% 42.40% 
16.20% 
69 
Tab. 5.8 ·Distribution of exports in IF, NIF and SERF 
by sector and size. 1989-92 
(column percentages) 
1989 1992 1989-92 
INNOVATING Non R&D-oriented 26.1 26.8 26.3 
FIRMS sectors 
R&D-oriented 73.9 73.2 73.7 
sectors 
20-199 22.3 24.8 23.6 
200-499 15.1 15.3 15.1 
Over 500 62.6 59.9 61.3 
Total 100 100 100 
NON INNOVATING Non R&D-oriented 67.5 67.8 67.5 
FIRMS sectors 
R&D-oriented 32.5 32.2 32.5 
sectors 
20-199 81.8 84.3 82.7 
200-499 11.5 10.4 11.3 
Over500 6.8 5.3 6.0 
Total 100 100 100 
SERF Non R&D-oriented 41.5 41.5 41.3 
sectors 
R&D-oriented 58.5 58.5 58.7 
sectors 
20-199 41.0 43.9 42.4 
200-499 16.4 15.8 16.2 
Over 500 42.6 40.3 41.4 
Total 100 100 100 
Legenda: see table 1. 
Source: 1ST AT, CIS, SERF 
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(1) Exports of IF in class jfrotal exports from class j by firms included in SERF. 
(2) Exports of IF in class jfrotal exports by all firms included in SERF. 
Legenda: see table 1. 
Source: ISTAT, CIS, SERF. 
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Two main results emerge from these tables. First, IF show a major and increasing role 
on total exports. The R&D-oriented sectors and the largest companies have the largest 
share of exports from IF. None the less, exports from IF in the non-R&D-oriented 
sectors and from small IF shows higher growth. Secondly, small IF, although they have 
increased their weight in exports, still play a secondary role on total exports. Only 13% 
of total exports come from small IF as compared to a share of total exports from all 
small firms of above 40%. All in all, the figures from CIS confirms the restructuring of 
Italian exports toward the most traditional end of the industrial-spectrum, although this 
is accompanied by an increasing innovative content of traditional productions. 
Investment 
The share of investment in value added is higher in IF compared to NIF and SERF 
(over the period 15%, 10% and 13%, respectively, see table 5.10). In all groups, the 
non R&D-oriented sectors show the highest share. This may depend on the relevance of 
embodied innovations in these sectors. 
Over the period 1990-92, IF exhibit a positive average annual rate of growth of 
investment in machinery calculated in real terms (0.12, see fig. 5.4 and table 5.11). The 







Fig.5.4- Average rates of 





The comparison of the behaviour of firms over the cycle is particularly important in 
view of the Schumpeterian thesis of a 'compensation effect' to technological 
unemployment' on the demand side through 'autonomous investment' (see chapter 2 and 
appendix 2). It can be seen (fig.5.5) that IF were still raising investment in 1990 during 
the final phase of the expansion, when many classes of NIF were already decreasing it9. 
In 1991 investment growth was still positive in IF whereas it was negative in the other 
two groups. Finally, in 1992 investment fell less in IF than in NIF and SERF. 
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Tab. 5.10 ·Share of investment (1) on value-added in 
IF, NIF and SERF by sector and size. 1989-92. 
1989 1992 1989-92 
INNOVATING Total 0.14 0.15 0.15 
FIRMS 
Non R&D-oriented 0.15 0.16 0.16 
sectors 
R&D-oriented 0.14 0.14 0.14 
sectors 
20-199 0.13 0.13 0.13 
200-499 0.15 0.12 0.14 
Over 500 0.15 0.16 0.16 
NON INNOVATING Total 0.11 0.09 0.10 
FIRMS 
Non R&D-oriented 0.11 0.09 0.10 
sectors 
R&D-oriented 0.10 0.08 0.09 
sectors 
20-199 0.11 0.08 0.09 
200-499 0.13 0.10 0.11 
Over 500 0.16 0.13 0.18 
SERF Total 0.13 0.13 0.13 
Non R&D-oriented 0.13 0.13 0.14 
sectors 
R&D-oriented 0.13 0.12 0.13 
sectors 
20-199 0.12 0.11 0.11 
200-499 0.14 0.12 0.13 
Over 500 0.15 0.15 0.15 
Legenda: see table 1. 
Note: (1) Investment in machinery. 
Source: ISTAT, CIS, SERF. 
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Tab. 5.11 • Annual rates of growth of investment (1) in real terms 
in IF, NIF and SERF by sector and size.1989-92. 
(percentages) 
1990 1991 1992 1990-92 
INNOVATING Total 6.44 1.14 -6.77 0.12 
FIRMS 
Non R&D-oriented 14.57 6.82 -10.70 3.08 
sectors 
R&D-oriented 1.78 -2.53 -3.96 -1.58 
sectors 
20-199 8.01 2.09 -6.25 1.13 
200-499 6.43 -3.08 -10.90 -2.70 
Over 500 5.85 1.73 -6.09 0.37 
NON INNOVATING Total -0.35 -10.69 -11.49 -7.08 
FIRMS 
Non R&D-oriented 2.73 -14.02 -11.58 -7.30 
sectors 
R&D-oriented -8.92 -0.27 -11.22 -6.45 
sectors 
20-199 -1.18 -10.45 -9.08 -6.51 
200-499 -7.20 -9.55 -13.09 -9.02 
Over 500 20.31 -14.42 -32.17 -10.05 
SERF Total 4.42 -1.07 -8.58 -1.85 
Non R&D-oriented 8.40 -0.78 -9.78 -0.99 
sectors 
R&D-oriented 0.34 -1.39 -7.23 -2.74 
sectors 
20-199 2.01 -3.70 -3.10 -1.60 
200-499 4.38 -0.87 -14.62 -3.89 
Over 500 6.80 1.34 -11.34 -1.35 
NATIONAL 4.3 1.7 -1.5 0.5 
ACCOUNTS (1) 
Legenda: see table 1. 
Note: (1) Investment in machinery in manufacturing sector. 
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5.3. Impact of innovation on the composition of output and employment 
Structural change is the change in the composition of industrial and employment 
.. 
structure that results from technical change, from changes in the position of one country 
in the international division of labour and as an outcome of economic growth. 
Structural change is visible only over long periods of time. In addition, our data do not 
take into account births and deaths of firms, so that they under-estimate structural 
change. Therefore, we limit ourselves to few comments. 
Main findings 
Over the period, in all groups, the share of labour-inputs and output of R&D-
oriented sectors and large firms has fallen at the expense of the non R&D-oriented 
sectors and small firms. 
The share of women in the total and white-collar labour force is lower in IF than 
in the other two groups. In addition, it is lower in R&D-oriented sectors and in 
large firms. There are not perceptible changes over the period. 
The share of white-collar workers is higher in IF and, among them, higher in 
R&D-oriented sectors. The share is slightly increasing over time. It is not possible 
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to say whether this is a cyclical phenomenon (the recession usually hits blue 
collar workers first), or a structural change. Both factors are likely to be present. 
Details 
Output composition 
In all groups, in terms of hours worked and of value-added, the share of non R&D-
oriented sectors has increased from 1989 to 1992 in all groups (table 5.12). In terms of 
all the indicators (including in this case also the number of employees), the share of 
small firms has also increased in all groups. Among IF, for instance, the share of small 
firms has increased 1% in terms of employment, 2.2% in terms of hours worked, and 
3.3% in terms of value -added. 
Employment composition 
The share of women is lower in IF (table 5.13), both in the total labour-force (21%) 
and in white-collar workers (25%) compared to the other two panels (34% and 38% in 
NIF, and 26% and 29% in SERF, respectively). The share is higher in non R&D-
oriented and small units. There is no evidence of changes over the period. 
The average share of white collar workers in IF is 33% against 20% in NIF and 25% in 
SERF (table 5.14). It is higher in R&D-oriented sectors and increases with size. There 
is an upward trend, especially in IF, from 32% in 1989 to 34% in 1992. 
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Tab. 5.12 ·Distribution of employment, hours worked and value-added in IF, NIF and SERF by sector and size. 
1989 and 1992. 
(column percentages) 
EMPLOYMENT HOURS WORKED VALUE- ADDED 
1989 1992 1989 1992 1989 1992 
INNOVATING Non R&D-oriented 36.3 35.8 40.2 41.2 34.9 35.6 
FIRMS sectors 
R&D-oriented 63.7 64.2 59.8 58.8 65.1 64.4 
sectors 
20-199 27.0 28.6 30.0 32.2 23.5 26.8 
200-499 14.6 14.5 14.7 14.7 13.8 15.0 
Over 500 58.5 56.9 55.3 53.2 62.7 58.2 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
NON Non R&D-oriented 74.0 73.9 75.2 75.5 71.7 71.9 
INNOVATING sectors 
FIRMS 
R&D-oriented 26.0 26.1 24.8 24.5 28.3 28.1 
sectors 
20-199 84.3 85.2 85.4 85.6 82.5 84.2 
200-499 10.7 10.2 10.1 10.0 11.5 11.0 
Over 500 5.0 4.7 4.5 4.4 6.0 4.8 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
SERF Non R&D-oriented 52.8 52.3 56.8 57.7 48.8 49.6 
sectors 
R&D-oriented 47.2 47.7 43.2 42.3 51.2 50.4 
sectors 
20-199 49.3 51.0 53.3 55.3 43.4 46.2 
200-499 15.0 14.7 14.5 14.4 15.2 15.8 
Over 500 35.8 34.4 32.2 30.3 41.4 37.9 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Legenda: see table 1. 
Source: !STAT, CIS, SERF. 
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Tab. 5.13 - Share of women on total employees and 'white collars' 
by sector and size in IF, NIF and SERF. Average 1989-92. 
INNOVATING FIRMS 
1989 -92 
On total On white 
employees collars 
Total 0.21 0.25 
von R&D-oriented 0.23 0.32 
sectors 
R&D-oriented 0.19 0.22 
sectors 
20-199 0.26 0.34 
200-499 0.25 0.27 
Over 500 0.18 0.21 
Legenda: see table 1. 























Tab.5.14 ·Share of 'white collars' on total employees in IF, NIF and SERF 
by sector and size. 1989-92. '• 
1989 1992 1989-92 
INNOVATING Total 0.32 0.34 . 0.33 
FIRMS 
Non R&D-oriented b.25 0.26 0.25 
sectors 
R&D-oriented 0.36 0.38 0.37 
sectors 
20-199 0.25 0.27 0.26 
..... 
200-499 0.32 0.34 0.33 
Over 500 0.36 0.37 0.36 
NON INNOVATING Total 0.19 0.20 0.20 
FIRMS 
Non R&D-oriented 0.17 0.18 0.18 
sectors 
R&D-oriented 0.25 0.26 0.25 
sectors 
20-199 0.18 0.19 0.19 
200-499 0.23 0.24 0.23 
Over 500 0.28 0.27 0.27 
SERF Total 0.28 0.29 0.29 
Non R&D-oriented 0.22 0.23 0.22 
sectors 
R&D-oriented 0.35 0.37 0.36 
sectors 
20-199 0.22 0.23 0.23 
200-499 0.30 0.32 0.31 
Over 500 0.35 0.37 0.36 
Legenda: see table I. 
Source: !STAT, CIS, SERF. 
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5.4. Explorative regression analysis 
A simple regression exercise using Generalised least squares has been accomplished on 
IF and NIF to test at the enterprise level the effects of being innovative on the growth 
rate of (gross) employment (Y1), growth rate of hours worked (Y2). the growth rate of 
exports (Y3) and of value-added (Y 4). The independent variables were 
Z 1 = a dummy variable indicating the introduction (or non introduction) of innovations 
over the period 1990-92; 
Z2 = firms' size measured by the number of employees in 1989; 
Z3 = industry firms belong to. 
Table 5.15 shows the results of the exercise. The values of the multiple correlation 
coefficient R2 are always low. This is hardly surprising in an exercise carried out on 
almost 6,000 observations using only few independent variables. Behaviour at the level 
of the individual firm can indeed depend on many factors, some of which of very 
specific nature, that are not easily captured by statistical surveys or by any simple 
model. Only in the case of the first two equations the global model is statistically 
significant (measured by the F-test). 
Looking at the impact of the independent variables, being innovative has a positive and 
statistically significant effect on the rates of change of employment (Y 1) and hours 
worked (Y2). Firms' size has a negative effect on both variables. However, this effect is 
statistically significant only in the case of employment. The sector firms belong to 
significantly affects both variables (the sign of the influence depends of course on the 
sector). 
Being innovative influences positively the growth rates of exports and value-added, but 
the coefficients are not significant. The same is true for the negative effect of firms' 
size. 
Comparing these results with those obtained from the tables, one should pay attention 
to the fact that in the regression analysis the rates of change of the independent 
variables in each firm have the same weight irrespective of the size of the firm. 10 The 
opposite is true in the tables (that are actually weighted averages of firms' growth rates). 
Therefore, the positive impact of innovation on the use of labour inputs shown by 
regression analysis strongly reflects the behaviour of small IF (that are by far the 
majority of the sample of IF), that we known from tables 5.2 and 5.3 to have shown a 
better outcome from this point of view. The fact that size does not show a significant 
effect on variations of hours worked (although the sign is negative, as expected), may 
depend on the fact that NIF are included, and that in terms of hours worked small NIF 
80 
do not present a relative perfonnance as good as small IF. The fact that the sector has a 
significant influence is also consistent with the finding of the tables that among IF there 
were differences between R&D and non R&D-oriented sectors, the latter doing better in 
terms of hours worked. 
Less expected is the absence of significant effects of being innovative and of size on 
export growth (although the signs of the coefficients are those expected). This result 
suggests that although at an aggregate level the perfonnance of IF is better than that of 
NIF, at the finn level the effect of innovations on exports is less systematic, and 
although a number of IF may have significantly increased their exports, there is also a 
large number that have not. 
5.5. Review of the chapter 
The results of this chapter should be considered with some caveats. The limitations of 
the available labour-input indicators, the lack of infonnation on finns' births and deaths 
and the short period covered by CIS, suggest that any conclusion about the direct 
impact of innovation on the perfonnance of IF should be drawn with caution. The 
implicit assumption that the business cycle affects to the same degree IF, NIF and 
SERF finns should also be taken into account. Moreover, it should be recalled that IF 
have been defined on the basis of innovations introduced sometimes in the period 1990-
92. This is a very loose definition of IF, since NIF and SERF finns may have 
introduced innovations before this period. On the opposite, IF may have introduced 
innovations at the end of the period (say in 1992), too late to affect their perfonnance. 
Finally, chapter 4 showed the difficulties of drawing the macro-economic implications 
of the micro-economic behaviour. With these caveats, let us review the main findings. 
IF as a whole do not perfonn better than the control groups in tenns of output and 
labour-input growth. However, small IF exhibit the best employment and output 
perfonnance of any other class of finns (to help the reader, fig.5.7 summarises some 
results concerning small IF and all IF, respectively). This is in line with similar results 
in other countries (OECD, 1994, 1995). It should be noted that small IF are only 20% 
of all small finns included in SERF, and that their encouraging employment outcome 
can have just resulted from the displacement of less competitive small finns. 
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Tab. 5.15 • Summary of regression analysis. 
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Fig.S. 7 - Performance indicators of 
IF. Average annual rates of change 
over 1990-92 . 
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In the light of chapter 4, some macro-economic conclusions may be derived looking at 
the impact of innovations on exports and investment. 
CIS results show that over half of the total Italian exports (as measured by the panel of 
SERF) come from innovating firms, in particular from R&D-oriented sectors and large 
enterprises. Nonetheless, small firms play a significant role on total Italian exports 
covering over 40% of them. Yet, only one third of the small firm export share come 
from small IF. 
, Over the period, and before the devaluation of the Italian lira in September 1992, all 
types of Italian firms made an effort to expand their sales abroad. IF have been more 
successful than other types in the attempt, both in terms of share of exports on sales and 
in terms of exports growth. The best results are shown by the non-R&D-oriented 
sectors and by small IF. 
In view of our theoretical approach and within the limits of the available data, the 
overall export performance of IF suggests that in Italy innovation has had a positive 
impact on employment through exportsu. However, it is not possible to say to what 
degree this compensation effect has been sufficient to recover the jobs lost by the 
application of new process technologies. Certainly, although innovation is associated 
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with above average exports growth, this has not been sufficient to compensate for the 
fall in the rate of growth of domestic aggregate demand. 
With respect to investment, the results show that IF have a higher propensity to invest, 
and that they cut their investment in plants and machinery later and to a smaller degree 
than the other classes of firms. This may actually lend some . ~upport to the 
Schumpeterian argument that it is mainly technical change and not effective demand 
that affects investment decisions through 'autonomous investment'. 
Such a conclusion should be considered with much caution. In the short run innovation-
related investment may be less sensitive to cyclical changes in effective demand. As a 
result, autonomous investment may have acted to an extent as a sort of stabiliser (a 
'floor' in the terminology of 'cyclists') in the down-swing. Yet, the results suggest that, 
though to a lesser degree over the years considered compared to the other groups 
investment decisions by IF are also seriously affected by the fall in effective demand 
caused by the deflationary policies adopted in Italy and elsewhere. 
In spite of their still important role, in Italy large, R&D-oriented IF continue to decline 
in favour of more traditional, non R&D-oriented small firms. Structural change in Italy 
has continued along the path set in the past two decades, showing the expansion of the 
small firms sector and the contraction of the large, more R&D-oriented companies. 
Technical change is generally associated with changes in the skill~ required by 
production process and organisational innovations at various hierarchical levels. It has 
been traditionally debated whether innovations brought about a de-skilling or greater 
demand for better qualified labour force. There seems to be a general consensus that at 
present technical change, accompanied by c~mpetition from low-wage newly 
industrialising countries, is leading to the expulsion of low-skilled workers. 
From our data it emerges that being innovative is linked to higher shares of qualified 
workers - measured through the share of white collar workers. The latter share has 
increased slightly over the period 1990-92, but it is not clear whether this was the result 
of a structural or of a cyclical change in the composition of the labour force. The fact 
that the share of white-collar workers has increased more in IF lends some support to 
the first hypothesis. 
Innovation does not favour female employment. The latter is higher in small non-
innovating firms belonging to traditional sectors. This confirms the conclusions of a 
large body of literature according to which women are relegated to the low-skilled 
positions in the labour force, which tend to be negatively affected by process 
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innovations (Bettio, 1988). The share of women on the labour force has not changed 
substantially over the period. 
To sum up, the Italian experience over the period 1989-92 shows that innovation is 
linked to positive job creation in small firms, to above average export growth, to above 
average investment performance and to the expansion of the share of white collar 
workers. The impact on export can be regarded as having a positive effect, whether 
direct and/or indirect, on employment. The investment behaviour of IF may have had 
positive counter-cyclical effects on employment. It should be noted that the good 
performance of IF in exports and investment mainly concern the non R&D-oriented 
sectors. Therefore, over the years 1990-92 Italy has continued to specialise in her 
industrial model, consisting of a mixture of innovation and tradition (i.e. the ability to 






'Cassa integrazione guadagni' provides unemployment benefits to workers that, in principle, are still in 
firms' pay-rolls (and in this capacity they appear· in our data as still employed). However, in some 
instances, workers may never return to their occupations. 
2 A sector was defined as 'R&D-oriented' if the sum of the firms doing systematic R&D plus 2/3 of those 
performing occasional R&D (both figures taken from CIS) was over 50% of the total number of firms in 
the industry. The list of sectors included in each class is on table 5.1. 
3 It should be observed that the average values shown in the tables (e.g. average growth rates) are 
weighted averages of the figures at the enterprise level. On the opposite, regression analysis is carried 
out on figures at enterprise level. In the first case large firms tend have a greater influence on the 
aggregate results than smaller units. In the second case all firms are on an equal foot independently of the 
size. 
4 The period considered includes the tail of the expansion that characterised the OECD countries in the 
second half of the eighties, and the beginning of the severe recession that marked the early nineties. The 
rates of growth of the Italian GDP over the three years were 2.1 %, 1.2% and 0.7%. The corresponding 
rates of growth of dependent employment (in full-time equivalent) were 1.2%, 0.6% and -0.5% (source 
Istat, National accounts, 1988-94, mimeo). 
5 This is not surprising since very few firms that carry out R&D are included among NIF. 
6 Moreover, the values for 1991 are inflated by a large recruitment of workers by the main Italian car 
maker.for a new plant in the South of the country. 
7 According to the (1994, tab.l.8) the gross job tum-over in Italy over the period 1989-92, taking into 
accounts only 'expansions' and· 'contractions' of firms (as we have done here), has been 16.1% on 
average. The figure is higher than the one obtained here since it includes also firms with less than 20 
employees. The correspondent figure for the United Kingdom is 9.1% (1989-91) and for the United 
States 8.6% (1989-91). The countries with more 'rigid' labour-markets show higher rates of tum-over. 
This is the case of France (with a rate of 13.6% over 1989-92), Germany (12.1% over 1983-90) and 
Italy. 
8 Productivity is measured by the ratio between value-added and the number of employees (or of total 
worked hours): Productivity growth is the difference between the rate of growth of value-added in real 
terms and that of employment (or of worked hours). It should be noted that over a short period of time, 
as the one considered here, the main factor affecting productivity is the business cycles. The latter affects 
the degree of utilisation of existing productive capacity, that is the output obtained by given amounts of 
physical and human resources. Technical change exerts its effects over longer periods of time. 
9 A lagged response of investment to demand growth is typical in Italy, especially among small firms. 
10 See above fn.3. 
11 A contrast emerges between the dismal performance of IF in terms of total output growth (see§ 5.1) 
and the better performance in terms of exports growth. The economic policies pursued in these years 
seems to have affected more the domestic performance of IF than their external results. The fixed 
exchange rate policy strictly observed from the late eighties till the end of the pcf'riod here considered 
has certainly advantaged foreign competitors in the Italian market. It may be possible that Italian firms 
have chosen to yield lower profit margins for unit of product sold abroad, in order to maintain their 
foreign market share, while maintaining their profit margins in the internal markets, suffering in terms of 
market shares from the cost advantages of foreign firms. In addition, the deflationary policies pursued by 
the Italian authorities to curb the public debt may have hit more IF, that possibly produce more 
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expensive/high quality goods, than more traditional products offered by NIF. Finally, cuts in the public 
procurement policy (that usually advantages national champions) and the diminished State support to 
l~ge high-tech. companies belonging to the Public sector are also part of the explanation. 
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Chapter6 
The employment performance of different types of innovating firms 
and the impact of innovation variables 
This chapter focuses upon different types of innovating firms that emerge from the 
combination of different innovation inputs and outputs. Interestingly, a large degree of 
variety of innovative behaviour is also present among small IF. Those types of small 
firms that rely more on traditional innovation sources and less on R&D exhibit a better 
performance. This result shows that in Italy the difficulties of the R&D-based firms 
concerns both large and small companies. Discriminant analysis is also used to assess 
the impact of some innovation variables on firms' performance. It confirms that firms' 
size is an important factor to explain the employment performance, and that the non-
R&D sources of technical knowledge have a positive effect on performance. 
6.1. Variety of innovative behaviour and economic performance: a multivariate 
analysis. 
CIS provides a variety of data on the input and output of economic activities. The, 
objective of this section is to use this information to classify innovating firms in order 
to. compare the occupational and economic results associated with each type of 
innovative behaviour (Pavitt, 1984; Cesaratto, Mangano 1993; Cesaratto at al. 1996). 
Given the importance of small firms in job creation, as it emerged from chapter 5 and 
from the literature, a special classification has been carried out, in addition to the 'global 
one', concerning firms with less than 200 employees ('small-firms classification'). 
A set of variables has been selected from the CIS questionnaire that were considered the 
most effective in describing the innovative behaviour, and also the most suitable to the 
chosen statistical technique. 
The selected variables can be grouped as follows: 
innovation inputs: 
-typology of R&D activity: 
[1] continuous; [ 1A] occasional; [ lB] absent; 
-financial commitment to innovation: 
[2] R&D/sales; [3] Investment on innovative fixed capital/sales; [4] 
Innovation costs/sales; 
- distribution of innovation costs among: 
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[5] R&D; [6] Patent licences; [7] Design; [8] Trial production; [9] Market 
analysis1; 
innovation output: 
- distribution of sales among: 
[13] products innovated only from the point of view of processes; [14] 
incremental product innovations; [15] major product innovations. 
Next, following a standard procedure, we applied Factor analysis to synthesise the 
informative content of innovation variables; and then Cluster analysis to synthesise the 
variety innovative behaviour of firms. 
Factor and Cluster analyses 
In dealing with many observed units (firms), each defined by many variables (the 
innovation-variables), it is useful firstly to synthesise the number of variables. Factor 
analysis identify a number of new variables, the principal components (PCs) each of 
which synthesises the contribution of one of more of the original variables. 
Subsequently, on the basis of the new synthetic variables, cluster analysis forces the 
units into homogeneous groups. Both methods help to . reduce the variety of the 
phenomenon under scrutiny to a manageable size. 
The first eight PCs explain 75% of the variability, and each one is associated to one or 
more of the original variables (see appendix 5). 
6.2. The global classification · 
' 
The first classification concerns 7,253 firms. 9 main groups or types of innovating firms 
were obtained (fig.6.1 ). First, we briefly describe each type. Then we compare their 
respective occupational and economic performance. Table 6.1 summarises the values 
taken by each cluster for the 15 variables used to classify firms2. 
The bottom row of the table shows the coefficients of variation - a measure of the 
'dispersion' of values around their average- concerning innovation inputs (variables I-
ll) and outputs (variables 12-15). The coefficient of the former group of variables are 
generally higher than those of the latter. It means that, with few exceptions, clusters are 
different more from the point of view of the sources of innovation than from that of 
innovative content of sales. 
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Tab. 6.1 • Results of 'global' duster analysis. Values of the variables employed In the analysis 
Tlpology of R&D 
CLUSTER 
'JI> of firms Average Continuous Occasional Absent R&D/sales Investment/sales lnnov.costslsales 
n. Definitions size ·r· 0~0 •r• 
I R&D-based 28.9 317 100.0 0.0 0.0 21.8 24.5 28 7 
2 R&D imensive 4.0 494 99.3 0.0 0.7 110.0 60.3 141.7 
3 Highly R&D-imensive 0.6 270 73.8 16.7 9.5 372.4 175.3 429.1 
4 OcCJU. R&D-based 15.2 72 0.0 100.0 0.0 14.9 38.5 24.5 
5 Design-based 8.9 101 26.7 4.8 68.5 7.0 38.4 40.8 
6 Market-oriemed 9.9 115 21.8 2.0 76.3 4.6 57.6 33.3 
7 Prod.inn.s oriem. 5.4 78 42.2 10.5 47.3 15.2 54.2 29.1 
8 Inven.based 25.2 65 0.1 0.0 100.0 0.0 84.0 3.7 
9 Licenses-based 1.8 105 26.1 11.2 62.7 8.7 37.0 38.2 
Total 100 167 40.7 16.7 42.7 174 53.6 31.0 
(7253 firms) 
Coeff.vat.(l) 0.7 1.0 0.3 0.9 0.5 0.4 
Distribution of Innovation costs: Shares of sales: 
RctD Licenses Industrial Trial Marketing Notmnovated Process Product 
design production safes innovanons innovanons 
I R&D-based 57.5 1.6 17.0 17.9 4.7 41.9 23.7 344 
2 Rlr.D imensive 60.2 2.7 16.8 15.9 4.4 36.5 18.2 45.4 
3 Highly Rlr.D·illlensive 54.4 1.0 17.6 19.0 5.7 32.8 19.3 47.9 
4 Occas. R&D-based 48.2 1.8 19.0 23.2 5.3 42.7 27.9 29.5 
5 Design-based 7.9 1.0 740 7.9 2.2 34.1 25.9 40.0 
6 Market-oriented 4.5 1.9 13.9 57.0 22.7 41.3 29.2 29.5 
7 Prod.iM.s rient. 31.2 1.5 16.7 is.5 2.4 8.2 1.8 900 
8 Invest.based 3.7 0.6 2.8 2.4 0.6 41.6 47.0 11.5 
9 Licenses-based 8.8 77.6 6.9 1.2 40.3 31.3 28.5 
Total 30.6 2.8 18.3 17.4 5.1 39.1 29.7 31.3 
I• Coeff. var.( I) 1.6 0.6 0.4 3.1 4.8 0.5 0.7 0.8 
Note: (I) Standard dev ./average 
Source: !stat. CIS 
90 
6.2.1. Description of types of innovative behaviour 
The different types are grouped in three sets: (a) R&D-based types, (b) types based on 
other internal sources of knowledge, (c) types based on external sources of knowledge. 
As in previous exercises (Cesaratto, Mangano 1993; Cesaratto et al, 1996), each type 
contains a variety of sectors, although some are more strongly represented than others. 
· Symmetrically, each sector is spread over a number of types, although more 
concentrated in some of them. This shows the advantage of this classification, as an 
approach to the variety of innovative behaviour, over a sectoral classification. 
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R&D-based clusters 
1. R&D -based type 
This is the largest type both in terms of employment and output3. The average 
size of the units is above average. Continuous R&D is the main innovation 
source. Both the shares of sales due to non-innovative products and to product 
innovations are above average. 
2&3. R&D-i,ntensive type, Highly R&D -intensive types 
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Both types translate the high financial commitment to R&D and innovative 
investment into an above-average share of product innovation4• The typical size is 
above average. 
4. Occasional R&D-type 
Occasional R&D is typical of a large group of below-average size units5• The 
financial commitment to innovation is below average. The shares of non 
innovated sales is above average. 
Types based on other internal sources of knowledge 
5. Industrial design-based type 
The enterprises in this type are small on average and base their innovation mainly 
on industrial design6• The financial commitment to R&D and innovative 
investment is below average, but innovations costs are above average. Product 
innovations (typically of an incremental nature) are well above average. 
6. Market-oriented type 
Characteristic of this type is the high share of innovation costs attributed to trial 
production and marketing7• This suggests that firms in this type focus their 
innovative activities upon the next-to-market end of the innovation pipeline. The 
shares of sales devoted to innovative investment and innovation costs are slightly 
above average, whereas R&D does not seem very relevant, although one quarter 
of firms declared carrying it out on a continuous base. In spite of the market 
orientation, the share of non-innovative sales is only slightly above average. 
7. Product-innovations oriented type 
Firms included in this type show a below average size8• They are characterised by 
a well above average tendency to introduce product innovations (mainly radical 
innovations). Looking at innovation inputs, it is difficult to recognise a clear 
innovative behaviour since all the values are practically equal to the average 
values. One is brought to conclude that either (i) the remarkable rate of the 
introduction of product innovation is not linked to any particular innovation 
strategy, but to firm-specific entrepreneurial capacities; or (ii) that these firms 
tended to overestimate the number of their product innovations. 
Types based on external sources of knowledge 
8. Investment-:-based type 
Firms included in this type show a very small average size9• They rely on 
embodied-innovations. Internal sources of innovation are practically absent (90% 
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of them did not answer to the question concerning the distribution of costs of 
internal sources of innovation) and the product mix has changed mostly as a 
consequence of process innovations, whereas product innovations played an 
insignificant role. 
9. License-based type 
The small average-size firms included in this small type base their innovations on 
the acquisitio~ of licenses10• Most of them do not carry out R&D. Hence, the 
acquisition of external technology is not coupled with an internal effort to develop 
new knowledge. 
To sum up, the results show that most of the IF carrying out continuous R&D are 
concentrated in one large type (28.9% of firms are in type 1). A smaller number is in 
type 2 (4%), and few other highly innovative firms in type 3. The most traditional 
innovation channel, ~ased on the acquisition of new machinery, is still an important 
innovation source. A quarter of IF relies almost exclusively on this source (25.2% of 
firms are in type 8). It should be noted that embodied innovation may result in very 
significant technical change within firms, and that users often play an active role in the 
design of new machinery. In addition, this innovation channel may play a major role 
outside our sample of IF. Industrial design plays a minor role (8.9% of firms in type 5) 
compared to previous findings (Cesaratto, Mangano 1993; Cesaratto et al 1996)u. 
Cluster analysis associates trial production to marketing (type 6 contains 9.9% of 
firms), representing a 'next-to-the market' innovation type. According to survey results, 
innovation based exclusively upon the acquisition of licenses is a minor innovation 
channel (1.8% of firms are classified in type 9). 
6.2.2. Comparison of the performance of different types 
Table 6.2 shows the variations of employment, total hours worked and various other 
economic variables. 
Employment and hours worked 
Once again, the employment variations diverge from the variations of hours worked. 
Only two clusters show a positive performance in terms of these indicators. The first is 
the Highly R&D-intensive type (over the period 1990-92 the average annual growth 
rate of employment in this type was 47.2% and that of hours worked 34.9%). The 
second is the Market-oriented types (0.82% and 0.68% ). The first type is clearly the 
case of a limited number of very successful highly innovative firms. 
93 
Tab. 6.2 • Comparison of the employment and value added growth rates of different types of IF. 1989 92 
(percentages) 
Annual Annual Annual Annual Annual 
rates of growth rates of growth Gross job rates of growth growth rate growth rate 
of employment of hours worked tum-over of value-added of per-capita of per-hour 
(in real terms) productivity productivity 
1990-92 1990-92 1990-92 1990-92 1990-92 1990-92 
n. CLUSTERS 
R&D-based 0.07 -2.08 14.8 0.71 0.64 2.79 
2 R&D intensive 0.09 -3.31 16.5 1.38 1.29 4.69 
3 Highly R&D-intensive 47.25 34.91 81.4 66.21 18.96 31.30 
4 Occas. R&D-based 0.89 -0.82 12.0 1.42 0.53 2.24 
5 Design-based 1.29 -0.98 ll.S 7.12 5.83 8.10 
6 Market-oriented 0.82 0.68 17.0 5.05 4.23 4.37 
7 lnvest.based -0.52 -1.51 10.4 3.09 3.61 4.60 
8 Prod.inn.s orient. 1.01 -1.72 10.4 6.27 5.27 7.99 
9 Licenses-based -0.13 -2.87 8.3 3.62 3.75 6.49 
Total 0.37 -1.64 14.3 1.87 1.49 3.51 
Source: ISTAT, CIS, SERF. 
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Two types exhibit a negative perfonnance in tenns of both indicators, the Investment-
based (-0.52% and -1.51 %) and the License-based types (-0.13% and -1.64%). The 
case of the Investment-based type may suggest a negative impact of process innovations 
on employment. 
The two larger R&D-based types (1&2) show a positive but below-average 
perfonnance in tenns of employment, and a negative below-average result in tenns of 
hours worked. Other results show that in the case of the R&D-intensive type there has 
been a substitution of white for blue collar workers (the share of white collar workers 
has increased by 4% ), so that the fall in hours worked might, at least partially, be 
explained by a changing composition of the labour force. 
The evidence shows that the highly innovative types 2 and 3 present a high job turn-
over (16.5% and 81.4%, respectively, against an average of 14.3%). A high job turn-
over is also found, however, in the more traditional Market-oriented type (17% ). The 
high job tum-over of the Highly R&D-intensive type shows that, whenever it is 
necessary, finns can afford a high rate of job tum-over even in supposedly over-
regulated labour markets. 
Value-added and productivity 
Over the period, all sectot:s show positive average annual rates of growth of value 
added. The R&D-based and R&D-intensive types show below-average rates (0.71% and 
1.38%, respectively, against an average value of 1.87%). The Highly R&D-intensive 
type shows the highest growth rate (66.2% ). Design-based, Marketing-oriented and the 
Product innovations-oriented types all show an above average perfonnance. 
The Highly R&D-intensive type shows the highest rates of growth of productivity both 
in per-capita and in per-hour worked tenns. This result is associated to high growth 
rates both of value added and employment. Productivity growth is above average also 
in the Design-based the Product innovations-oriented types. This is the outcome of a 
good growth rate of value added and a fall of hours worked. By contrast productivity 
growth is below average in the R&D-based type. This outcome is associated to dismal 
growth rates of both value added and worked hours. 
Exports and Investment 
In tenns of the share of exports in sales (table 6.3), the Product-innovations oriented, 
R&D-based and Design-based types show the highest shares (respectively 34%, 30% 
and 28% in 1992). On the contrary, the R&D-intensive and Highly R&D-intensive types 
present below-average shares (20% and 10%, respectively). Other data show that the 
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share of exports by the Highly R&D-intensive type has fluctuated over the period. This 
suggests that the presence of firms of this type in international markets is not firmly 
established. 
Looking at the distribution of exports among different types, over 65% come from the 
R&D-based type (against a share of 54.5% of total employment). The export share 
becomes 71% if we add the R&D-intensive type. The other types show much lower 
shares. 
Over the period, exports have grown in all types, with. the exception of the R&D-
intensive and License-based types. The Highly R&D-intensive type show the highest 
growth rate of exports. However, its share of total exports, although increasing from . 
0.18% in 1989 to 0.47% in 1992 is still tiny. The R&D-based type shows a slightly 
below-average growth rate of exports and the R&D-intensive type a negative one. This 
result is consistent with that of chapter 5 that showed that a better export performance is 
found among the non-R&D sectors. In terms of our types, the highest export growth 
rates can be find in the Design-based, Investment-based, Market-oriented, Occasional 
R&D-based and Product innovation-oriented types. 
The R&D-based and the Market-oriented types display the highest share of investment 
in value-added. This result is partially in contrast to the one obtained in chapter 5. We 
found there that the non-R&D sectors had the highest share. However, at least the 
Market-oriented type is a non-R&D-based type. 
Over the period the rate of growth of investment in machinery has been negative in the 
R&D-intensive type and in the R&D-based type. It has also been negative in the 
Design-based type. The most encouraging results occur in the Highly R&D-intensive 
type and in the Market-oriented type. It is positive in the Occasional R&D-based, 
Investment-based, Product innovations-oriented and License-based types. These 
outcomes are consistent with those of chapter 5 where investment was shown to be 
more sustained in the non-R&D-based sectors. 
6.2.3. Final comments 
The results of the 'global' cluster analysis reinforce the conclusions of chapter 5. On the 
one side, the two largest R&D-based types (1&2) display below average outcomes in 
terms of employment, hours worked, output, exports and investment growth. On the 
other side, they show a higher propensity to export. Actually, 73% of exports from all 
clusters come from these types. A small, number of very innovative R&D based firms 
(type 3) show a more encouraging performance. The non R&D based types, in 
particular the Market-oriented type, generally show better results. 
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Tab. 6.3 • Comparison of tbe export and investment perfonnance of different types of IF. 1989 92 
CLUSTERS Exports/ Distribution Annual growth Investment/ Annual growth 
Sales of exports rates of exports · value-added ( l) rates of investment (I ) 
(column%) (%) (%) 
1989-92 1989-92 1990-92 1989-92 1990-92 
R&D-based 0.28 65.19 4.51 0.16 -0.49 
2 R&D intensive 0.20 8.42 -0.03 0.12 -4.68 
3 Highly R&:D-intens. 0.10 0.25 71.34 0.15 48.91 
4 Occas. R&D-based 0.23 5.35 6.29 0.14 0.41 
5 Design-based 0.27 4.91 12.70 0.13 -0.39 
6 Market-oriented 0.21 6.05 6.01 0.16 8.49 
7 Invest. based 0.19 6.08 6.16 0.14 0.52 
8 Prod.inn.s rient. 0.33 2.70 5.78 0.14 1.43 
9 Licenses-based 0.22 0.97 -0.67 0.15 1.69 
Total 0.26 100.00 4.81 0.15 0.12 
Notes: (l) Investment in machinery. 
Source: ISTAT, CIS. SERF. 
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6.3. The small firms classification 
In this case, cluster analysis has been applied to 6,312 small firms. 7 main types have 
been obtained (fig. 6.2). Not surprisingly, the typology shows a broad similarity to the 
'global classification'. Notwithstanding this similarity, it is interesting to single out the 
variety of innovation patterns that one can find among small firms and to compare their 
respective economic outcomes. 
6.3.1. Description of types of innovative behaviour 
The characteristics of types of small firms are broadly similar to those of the 
corresponding ones in the 'global classification' (see table 6.4). 
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4. Industrial design-based type 
5. Market-oriented type 
6. Investment-based type 
7. Licenses-based units 
The variety of types of innovating behaviour found among small firms is surprising. 
The share of firms carrying out R&D (firms in types 1 & 2 are 30.8% of the sample) 
slightly outnumber that of those which innovated in the most traditional way, that is by 
introducing embodied innovations (type 6 is 30.1 %). However, small 'Schumpeterian' 
high -tech. firms are very few (type 2 is only 0.1% ). The other three major groups are 
those relying on occasional R&D (type 3, 17.1%), on next-to-the market innovations 
(type 5, 10.8%) and on industrial design (type 4, 9.3%). 
6.3.2. Comparison of the performance of different types of small firms 
A comparison between tables 6.2, 6.3, concerning all firms, and table 6.5 reveals that 
the different types of small firms are more homogenous in terms of employment and 
economic performance than in the previous exercise concerning the total sample of 
innovating firms. 
The Design-based and Investment-based types show a good performance in terms of 
growth rates of employment, hours worked, value-added and exports. On a lesser 
degree this is true also for the Market-oriented type. Interestingly enough, in the case of 
small firms, investment-based innovative behaviour is not linked to a fall in the use of 
labour-inputs. This only happen when larger firms are included (as in type 8 of the 
global clustering). The other types show a positive result in terms of employment but 
not in terms of hours worked. Difficulties seem to have emerged for the R&D-intensive 
type that shows the largest fall in hours worked. 
In terms of export share in total sales (tab.6.6), R&D-based and Design-based types 
show the most encouraging results (respectively 28% and 26% against an average of 
24%). From the R&D-based type come almost half of total exports from this sample 
(compared to a share of total employment of 38.1%). It also shows the largest growth 
rate of exports over the period. With the exception of the R&D-intensive and License-
based types, all types show positive growth rate of exports. 
The highest share of investment in value-added is shown by the Investment-based type. 
I , I, 
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Tab. 6.4 • Results of cluster analysis on smaU firms. Values of tbe variables employed In tbe analysis. 
Tipology of R&D 
CLUSTER 
n.offums Average Continuous Occasional Absent R&D/sales Investment/sales Innov .costs/sales 
size .,.. .,.. .,.. 
n. Definitions 
R&D-based 29.8 73 100.0 0.0 0.0 31.5 28.8 41.3 
2 R&D-intensive 1.0 46 81.0 11.1 7.9 290.9 144.5 353.4 
3 Occas. R&D-based 17.1 51 0.0 100.0 0.0 15.3 39.3 25.2 
4 Design-based 9.3 54 18.9 6.7 74.4 6.6 41.3 43.6 
5 Market-oriented 10.8 54 20.7 1.6 77.7 4.9 59.6 35.1 
6 Jnve.•t.based 30.1 47 0.1 0.0 99.9 0.0 86.5 3.7 
7 Licenses-based 1.9 59 24.2 11.7 64.2 8.9 36.1 38.0 
Total 100 57 35.1 18.2 46.7 16.2 54.6 29.8 
(6312 finns) 
Distribution of innovation costs: Shares of sales: 
R&D Ucenses Industrial Trial Marketing 'lot innovatec Process Product 
design production sales innovations innovauons 
R&D-based 56.9 1.6 17.8 17.9 4.7 37.4 21.9 40.8 
2 R&D-intensive 56.8 20 15.4 i8.8 s.s 33.3 20.7 46.0 
3 Occas. R&D-based 48.3 1.8 18.6 23.4 5.3 40.9 26.7 32.5 
4 Design-based 6.5 1.0 76.5 7.0 2.0 32.7 26.5 40.8 
5 Market-oriented 4.8 2.1 14.2 56.0 23.0 39.5 29.1 31.4 
6 Jnvest.based 3.3 0.5 2.8 2.4 0.5 39.1 43.6 17.4 
7 Licenses-based 8.7 77.7 5.5 6.9 1.3 40.9 30.9 28.2 
Total 28.0 2.7 18.2 17.1 5.2 38.3 30.6 31.1 
Source: !stat, CIS 
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Tab. 6.5 • Comparison of the emplyment and value added growth rates of different types of Small firms IF. 
198992 
(percentages) 
Annual Annual Annual Annual Annual 
rates of growth rates of growth rates of growth growth rate growth rate 
of employment of hours worked of value-added of per-capita of per-hour i~ (in real terms) productivity productivity 
CLUSTER 1990-92 1990-92 1990-92 1990-92 1990-92 i 
n. ! ' 
R&D-based 1.76 -0.74 5.64 3.87 6.38 
2 R&D-intensive 1.43 -3.61 3.84 2.41 7.45 
3 Occas. R&D-based 0.69 -0.71 3.49 2.80 4.20 
4 Design-based 1.55 0.94 6.33 4.78 5.39 
5 Market-oriented 1.56 -0.01 3.66 2.09 3.67 
6 Invest. based 1.06 0.11 4.40 3.34 4.29 
7 Licenses-based 0.96 -0.81 5.26 4.30 6.07 
Simple average 0.78 -0.59 2.76 1.98 3.35 
Total (1) 2.44 0.63 6.30 3.86 5.67 
Note: (1) The total include non-classified firms. 
Source: Istat, CIS, SERF 
' . 
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Tab. 6.6 • Comparison of the export and investment performance of different types 
ofsmaU IF.198992 
CLUSTER Exports/ Distribution Annual growth Investment/ 
Sales of exports rates of exports value-added (1) 
(column%) (%) 
n. 1989-92 1989-92 1990-92 1989-92 
R&D-based 0.28 49.2 9.44 0.12 
2 R&D-intensive 0.22 0.6 -2.62 0.14 
3 Occas. R&D-based 0.23 13.4 6.68 0.12 
4 Design-based 0.26 9.1 6.31 0.12 
5 Market-oriented 0.22 9.8 7.60 0.13 
6 Invest. based 0.17 16.8 7.62 0.15 
7 Licenses-based 0.18 1.1 -5.59 0.11 
Simple average 0.22 4.20 O.Q7 
TOTAL (I) 0.24 100 9.27 0.13 
Note: (1) The total includes non-classified firms. 
Source: ISTAT, CIS, SERF. 
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6.3.3. Final comments 
The negative results of the small group of 'Schumpeterian' high-tech. firms included in 
the R&D-intensive type should be contrasted to the encouraging performance of this 
type in the 'global clusters'. The good results obtained in the 'global clusters' should 
then be attributed to the larger units and not to the small ones. By contrast, three 
traditional innovation channels based, respectively, on industrial design (type 4), 
investment (type 6) and next-to-the-market innovations (type 5) have emerged as the 
best performers. It should be noted that there is a strong complementarity between the 
design of new machinery carried out in the design-based type and its adoption in the 
investment-based type. 
To sum up, small firms based on R&D exhibit the poorest performance, whereas more 
'traditional' innovation patterns exhibit better results. This is an interesting result, since 
it suggests that in Italy the difficulties of the R&D-based enterprises do not concern 
only large firms, but also small firms. 
6.4. The impact of innovation variables: results of discririrlnant analysis 
In the previous sections we have identified different types of innovative behaviour. 
Now, we would like to assess the impact on firms' performance of the innovation 
variables we have used in cluster analysis. In this section we present the results 
obtained by using Canonical discriminant analysis. In plain words, firms are divided in 
two groups, those exhibiting an above-average performance and those presenting a 
below-average performance. Discriminant analysis shows whether the two groups are 
statistically distinct also from the point of view of the innovation variables. 
Regression analysis has also been carried out, but with unsatisfactory results. With few 
exceptions, single innovation variables does not show a statistical significant impact on 
performance. This may depend on many factors, for instance on the functional forms of 
the relationships, the quality of the variables used in the analysis etc. Not surprisingly, 
at the present stage of research on CIS data, more explorative techniques, such as 
cluster and discriminant analyses, have been more successful. More sophisticate 
regression models may be tried in the future. 
6.4.1. Description of the approach 
The following dependent performance-variable have been selected: 
Y1 = rate of change of employment over the period 1990-92 (n. of employees in 




Y 2 = rate of change of hours worked over the period 1990-92 (n. of hours worked in 
1992/n. of hours worked in 1989) 
Y 3 = variations of the 'employment share' of firm i in sector j, 1990-9212 
Y4 =variations of the 'hours worked share' of firm i in sector j, 1990-9213 
Y5 = variations of the 'export share' of firm i in sector j, 1990-9214 
The independent innovation-variables are those used in cluster analysis: 
XI =typology of R&D activity (continuos; occasional; absent) 15 
X2 = R&D/sales in 1992 
X3 = investment on innovated fixed capital/sales in 1992 
X4 = innovation costs/sales in 1992 
Xs-X8 = distribution of innovation costs among R&D; Patent licences; Design; Trial 
production; Market analysis 
X9-X11 =distribution of sales among not innovated products; products innovated only 
from the point of view of processes; incremental product innovations; major product 
innovations. 
Also firms' size (measured by the number of employees in 1989) has been included as 
an independent variable (SIZE) as a rough proxy for other factors affecting 
performance. 
Discriminant analysis divides the sample into two groups, one composed of those units 
that show an above average performance, a second with the units that exhibit a below 
average performance with respect to each performance-variable (Yh). Then a linear 
combination of the explicative variables (X) is calculated that is better correlated to the 
Y. In plain words, discriminant analysis permits to identify which innovation variables 
distinguish most between good and poor performers. 
On the basis ofthese Yh-variables, the variables Zh have been so defined: 
Zh < 2, if Yh < 0, h=l, ... ,5. 
In simple terms, the new variables Zh take value 1 when a firm has an above-average 
performance according to the performance-variable Yh. It takes value 2 in the opposite 
case of a below-average performance. 
The results are shown in table 6.7. 
6.4.2. Simple guidelines to the results 
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In looking at the results the following guidelines can be helpful. The results are grouped 
in three complementary sets: 
A. UNIVARIATE TEST STATISTICS: this test concerns the existence of statistically 
significative differences between the average values of the innovation-variables Xk 
taken in the two groups defined by each Yh. A quick look to this table shows which 
variables discriminate between above and below-average performers. 
B. MULTIVARIATE STATISTICS and EXACT F STATISTICS: These four tests 
('Generalised Mahalanobis distance; Maximum joint likelihood; Wilks test; Canonical 
R2)16 concern the overall difference between the two groups on the basis of all the 
innovation-variables. 
C. TOTAL CANONICAL STRUCTURE: it provides the coefficient-values of a 
discriminant-equation that assign each firm to one of the two groups on the basis of the 
values of the innovation-variables and of the similarity with the units already in a 
group. The coefficients vary between -1 and 1. They should interpreted according to 
this simple rule: 
the higher the absolute value taken by a negative Xk, the higher is its association 
to a good performance; the higher the value taken by a positive Xk, the higher is 
its association to a bad performance. For instance, looking at the top, right-hand-
side value, 0.69 indicates that size is positively related to a below-average 
employment performance. On the same row, -0.37 suggests that Xu (major 
product innovations) is positively related to an above-average employment 
performance. 
6.4.3. Illustration ofthe results 
Canonical-R2,, that measures the (linear) correlation between the Zh and the Xk 
variable, is low. Nonetheless, a certain number of innovation-variables discriminate 
quite well between high and low performers. Firms' size (SIZE) is the most effective 
influence on all performance-variable. 
Looking at the rate of change of hours worked (Z2) (that we consider as the most 
reliable indicator of labour input), the variables related to R&D (X 1, X2 and X5), 
innovation costs (X4) and SIZE show a negative influence. 
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Tab. 6.7 - Results of canonical discriminant analysis. 
Statistical significativity of innovation-varillbles 
Dep.var.s UNIVARIATE TEST STATISTICS 
XI X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8 
ZI 
Z2 xxxx XXX 
Z3 xxxx 










Values of the discriminant function (total canonical structure) 
Dep.var.s 
XI X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8 
Z1 0.02 -0.05 0.11 0.21 0.27 0.04 -0.14 0.24 
Z2 0.51 0.28 0.06 0.37 0.55 -0.03 -0.03 0.08 
Z3 -0.31 0.09 0.06 0.05 -0.32 -0.07 I 0.25 0.13 
Z4 0.51 0.01 -0.15 0.01 0.46 0.07 -0.16 -0.12 
Z5 0.28 O.I3 -0.02 -0.09 0.11 O.I5 -0.01 -0.31 
IMULTIV ARJATE STATISTICS 
Wilks Likeli Mahala Canoni 
hqod nobis ca1R2 
ratio 
xxxx xxxx xxxx 0.06 
xxxx xxxx xxxx 0.12 
xxxx xxxx xxxx 0.16 
xxxx xxxx xxxx 0.15 
xxxx xxxx xxxx 0.07 
LEGEND A 





Source: !STAT, CIS, SERF. 
X9 XIO XII SIZE 
XXX XXXX 
xxxx 
XXX XXXX XXXX XXXX 
XXXX XXX XXXX 
XXX X XXXX XXX 
X9 XIO Xll SIZE 
0.21 ~0.06 -0.37 0.69 
-0.01 0.01 -0.04 0.79 
-0.16 0.46 0.31 -0.58 
0.03 -0.40 -0.13 0.61 
0.43 -0.25 -0.57 0.42 
' 
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The 'hours worked share' (Z4), that indicates the relative expansion or contraction of 
each firm in its sector, is also negatively affected by two variables related to R&D (X 1 
and X5), but positively by the share of innovative investment on sales (X3), by the 
share of cost devoted to Industrial design and Trial production (X7 and Xg), by the 
share of incremental and significant product innovations (X 10 and X 11 ), and by SIZE. 
The 'export share' (Z5), that indicates the relative expansion or contraction of each 
firm's exports on total exports from its sector, is negatively affected by R&D (XI), but 
positively by Trial production (Xg), by product innovations (XIO and Xll) and by 
SIZE. 
6.4.4. Final comments 
The results of Discriminant analysis confirm those obtained in the previous sections and 
in chapter 5. They show that the employment and export performance of IF is positively 
affected by non R&D innovation sources, such as Design and Trial Production, and by 
product innovations. Size is also a very relevant factor which is negatively related to 
performance. 
6.4. Review of the chapter 
In this chapter explorative techniques have been adopted to identify different types of 
innovating firm and to assess the impact of' innovation-variables on performance-
variables. 
In the case of 'global' clustering not many differences have emerged in the employment 
performance of different types. Most of them just reflect the negative patterns of IF that 
have already emerged from chapter 5. The positive exceptions are a small, very 
innovative, type, and a more traditional type oriented towards product development and 
marketing. 
Cluster analysis on small firms show that only a minority of them innovate by acquiring 
new machinery. Many carry out R&D activities. Many others rely on various internal 
source of knowledge such as Design, Trial production and Marketing. In the case of 
small firms, the non R&D based innovation patterns generally exhibit better results. 
Discriminant analysis confirmed that non R&D innovation sources and small size are 
f 




The better performance shown by the non R&D-based innovation patterns suggests that 
Italy is able to compete by innovating traditional industrial practices, not suffering 
much from competition from low-wage countries. The coupling of a good design· and 
prompt diffusion of new machinery is the key to this result. Firms that base their 
innovations on a close look at markets seems also to perform well. The diffusion of 
entrepreneurial abilities in large areas of the Centre-North of Italy is also part of the 
explanation of the good performance of small firms. It is in the R&D-based types that 
Italy is experiencing the greatest difficulties. This discouraging result concerns both 
large and small firms. 
Footnotes 
1 Many flrms did not flU the part of the questionnaire concerning the distribution of innovation costs 
(that concerns internal sources of innovation). However, most of these firms put a figure on innovation-
related investment costs, showing that they were not ignoring the distribution of innovation costs, but 
that it did not apply to them. For this reason we have implicitly treated the missing values as a variable. 
2 In table 6.1 (and 6.4), for simplicity, var.14 and 15 have been merged. It should also.be noted that the 
distribution of innovation costs is not always 100% because missing values have been considered as a 
variable (as explained .in the previous footnote). 
3 The following sectors are particularly represented in this type: Chemical (54.9% of the flrms that 
belong to this sector belong also to type 1, as against an average of 28.9% from all sectors), Synthetic 
fibres (53.8%), Industrial machinery (38.1%), Electric, electronics (42.1%, Auto vehicles (38.9), Other 
transports (35.3%), Scientific instruments (40.3%). 
4 Typical sectors of cluster 2 are Computers (25.8% of flrms from this industry are in this type, against 
an average of 4%), Electric, electronics (10.8%) and Scientific instruments (15.3%). 
5 Many sectors are represented in this type with shares offlrms close to the average (which is 15.1%). 
The sectors with the highest shares are Synthetic fibres (23%), Metal products (19.2%) and Wood & 
furniture (20.3% ). 
6 Also in this case, a large number of sectors are present with shares of firms close to the average (which 
is 8.9%). The industry with the highest share is Machinery (12.5%). 
7 The sectors with the highest shares are Synthetic fibres (with 15.3% against an average share of 9.8% ), 
Wood & furniture (20.3% ), and Other manufacturing (17 .4% ). 
8 The Computer industry shows the highest share of flrms in this type (22.5% against an average of 
.5.3%). Textiles (12.1%), Leather (9.5%) and Wood & furniture (9.3% show also high shares. 
9 The industries with the highest share of firms in this type are Non metallic. mineral mining (60.6% 
against an average of 25.2%), Metal products (33.4%), Basic food production (35.2%), Food & drinks 
(34.5%), Textiles (37.6%), Clothing & footwear (40.1 %), Paper & printing (46.5%). 
10 The sector with the highest share of f~rms in this type is Chemical (with 4.1% against an average of 
1.8%). 
ll The introduction in this survey of additional innovation sources, such as occasional R&D (type 4 
absorbs 15.2% of flrm) and trial production, not present in the first Italian innovation survey or merged 
with design, is likely responsible for the diminished importance of design. 
12Th . at IS: 
employment of Fij in 1992 
employment of S j in 1992 
employment of Fij in 1989 
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employment of Sj in 1989 , where Fij is firm i in sector j, and Sj is sector j. Figures concerning Sj are 
taken from SERF. 
13 That is: 
worked-hours ofFij in 1992 
worked-hours of S j in 1992 
worked-hours ofFij in 1989 
worked-hours of Sj in 1989 . 
14 That is: 
exports ofFij in 1992 
export of Sj in 1992 
export of Fij in 1989 
export of Sj in 1989 
15 This variable has been re-quantified in a continuous variable through multiple correspondence 
analysis. Its values go now from -1.86 associated to the absence of R&D, 0 is associated to occasional 
R&D, 1.86 to continuous R&D. 
16 Only the most important tests are reported. 
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Conclusions 
1. The impact of innovation on employment in the Italian experience 
The results of the Italian Community Innovation Survey have provided an opportunity 
to look at the actual impact of innovations on employment at the enterprise level. In 
pursuing this objective, serious methodological problems have been faced. 
To begin with, CIS has not been designed to assess the occupational impact of 
innovations. We have compensated for this inadequacy by using information from other 
sources. Unfortunately, the additional information presented some serious 
shortcomings. In particular, the employment figures are gross of temporary lay-offs and 
total hours worked concern only blue-collars. 
Secondly, CIS regards a limited number of years, 1990-92, perhaps a period too short 
for measuring the long-run impact of innovation on employment which is, over short 
periods of time, much affected by the trade cycle. ~oreover, the period under 
consideration is not homogenous since it includes the last part of the expansion of the 
late eighties and the beginning of the severe recession of the early nineties. However, it 
might be appropriate to assume that the cycle and economic policies affect all firms to 
the same degree, so that the net effect of innovations on employment can still be 
assessed. 
Thirdly, the definition of innovating firms is a loose one. This is so because, in 
principle, non innovating firms and SERF firms may have introduced innovations 
before 1990-92, a period over which they were actually innovating firms; conversely, 
innovating firms may have introduced innovations only at the end of the period. 
Finally, there must be much caution in drawing conclusions regarding the overall 
manufacturing sector and the economy as a whole, from data concerning a sample of 
manufacturing enterprises. With regard to the manufacturing sector, encouraging results 
for, say, innovating firms may have been obtained by displacing less innovating firms. 
With respect to the economy as a whole, negative employment outcomes in innovating 
firms may be associated to positive output growth and indirect job creation in the 
service sector generated by, say, the higher effective demand that results from higher 
manufacturing exports. These issues have been dealt in part I (in particular inCh. 4). 
Over the period here considered ( 1990-1992), the employment and output performance 
of innovating firms does not look better than that of two control groups. The exception 
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are the small innovating firms. This is in line with similar results obtained by other 
investigations. 
The structure of the Italian manufacturing exports shows a polarisation between large, 
R&D-based companies and small, traditional firms, with small innovating firms playing 
a secondary role1• The export results of innovating firms indicates positive employment 
effects of innovations, directly on innovating firms, and indirectly on the economy by 
raising effective demand and the relaxation of the balance of payment constraint. 
However, the results of regression analysis suggests that, although the aggregate effects 
of innovation of export growth is positive, it is not statistically significant at the firm 
level (although the sign of the regression coefficient is still positive). 
Innovating firms display a relatively higher propensity to invest. Investment has also 
grown in innovating firms at a higher rate than in the control groups. This may lend 
some support to the idea that over the cycle 'autonomous investment' (linked to 
technical change), being less dependent on demand, may act as a 'stabiliser'. However, 
it is possible that more investment by innovating firms has resulted in less investment 
by less competitive firms. In addition, it is far from clear whether in the long run 
autonomous investment is a sufficient source of growth. In any event, investment by 
innovating firms has also been severely hit by the approaching recession caused by the 
deflationary policies in Italy and abroad. 
When classified according to the characteristics of the innovation variables, most of the 
different types of innovating firms, particularly those based on R&D as the main 
innovation source, follow the general downward trend in the use of labour-inputs. The 
special classification carried out on small firms shows that, in the Italian experience 
over the period covered by CIS, the best performers in terms of employment and other 
economic variables were those that innovated along traditional lines, such as the 
acquisition of new machinery, design, trial production and marketing. Also, 
discriminant analysis showed that non R&D-based innovation patterns, product 
innovations and small size are related to above-average employment and export 
outcomes. 
All in all, has innovation positively affected employment in the Italian experience over 
the period 1990-92? 
Looking at the direct effects on innovating firms, the answer is no, with the 
circumscribed exception of small firms. However, from this it cannot be concluded that 
innovation affected employment negatively, since we do not know what would have 
happened had those firms not innovated. The very fact that the best employment and 
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economic results have been found among those firms that follow the most traditional 
innovation patterns, may indicate that in the Italian experience those following the less 
traditional innovation patterns (that are generally based on continuous R&D activities) 
were not sufficiently effective. This has resulted in dismal sales growth to the 
advantage of foreign competitors (likely ore in the domestic market), so that the 
negative impact of process innovations has not been compensated by output growth at 
firm level. The more positive experience of a small group of firms exhibiting a very 
high financial commitment to R&D may show that a bigger effort is rewarded by high 
growth at enterprise level. 
The indirect effects of innovations through exports and investment look more 
encouraging. However, it must be noted that also in this case the most traditional 
innovation patterns were the most successful. 
2. The long period framework and policy issues in the Italian context 
To put these outcomes in perspective, our results show the continuation of a tendency 
towards the deterioration of the role of the large, R&D-~ased companies in Italy. Our 
results reveal that also small R&D-based firms show worse results compared to non 
R&D-based small innovating firms. The problems met by large firms are common to 
other European and OECD countries. However, in Italy the decreasing role of large 
firms and the emerging role of small firms has earlier origins in the seventies. 
In those years, the difficult industrial relations in big firms and the floating exchange 
rate policy encouraged the development of the small business sector whose competitive 
advantages were mainly based on cost (De Cecco, 1994). Large-scale industry only 
rationalised production in the eighties; once industrial relations became more 
favourable to entrepreneurs with a weaker resistance of workers to massive dismissals. 
Yet, the restructuring and the recovery of profitability in the eighties was not 
accompanied by the development of R&D-based activities. In terms of job creation, the 
small business sector was still the most vigorous, whereas the employment decline of 
the large enterprise sector has been continuous (Barca, Magnani, 1989). 
The participation of Italy in the EMS from 1979 was justified during the eighties, inter 
alia, as an industrial policy oriented to stimulate the introduction of innovations in the 
manufacturing sector (firms could not rely any more on devaluation to meet increasing 
wage costs and foreign competition). This policy is not generally considered a success. 
Anyway, it did not favour a change in the product specialisation of Italy. Moreover, in 
an economy based on cost competitiveness, the over-evaluation of the Italian lira may 
have favoured domestic de-industrialisation by increasing import penetration and 
112 
decentralisation of production in low-wage countries2• The deterioration of the trade 
balance in the late eighties reinforced these negative views. 
The years 1990-92 were of severe international recession (delayed, but more prolonged 
in Continental Europe). Domestic factors such as the progressive revaluation of the 
Italian lira in real terms with the consequent loss of export competitiveness, the 
restrictive fiscal policies and the decline in public works due to the discovery of 
widespread corruption made the situation in Italy worse. Our data show that small firms 
have continued to be the most successful under the difficult circumstances. Innovating 
firms were able to expand exports more than the other groups. Within them, those 
following the most traditional innovation patterns were the most effective. 
The devaluation of the Italian lira in September 1992 marks a significant change. In the 
last few years Italian exports have been the only growing component of effective 
demand (visible exports grew 9.1% and 10.9% in 1993 and 1994, respectively). Only 
late has investment begun to recover. Commentators suggest that traditional sectors are 
those that have mainly taken advantage of the recovered price competitiveness. 
In term of industrial p<)licy, our results re-propose the old dilemma whether and for how 
long can Italy successfully pursue her peculiar model of being innovative in traditional 
sectors, and what dangers may arise in the long run from lagging behind in R&D-based 
industries and from the decline of large firms. On the one side this model should not be 
opposed, as far as it goes (and it has already gone very far). On the other side there are 
not clear cut policies to improve the Italian competitiveness in R&D-based productions. 
Italian firms look interested in the co-operation with universities, perhaps more than 
they wish to take the risk of long-period in-house R&D (Cesaratto, Stirati, 1995). They 
should be encouraged to invest in intra-muros research, providing good employment 
perspectives and R&D facilities to young Italian researchers. In addition, it should not 
be forgotten that in Italy most of the high-tech. companies belong to the public sector, 
and that for many years (especially in the fifties) they have been competently managed 
and contributed to the technological development of the country. A rapid privatisation 
or lack of support to these companies may lead to the disappearance of many high-tech 
sectors in Italy. Of course, any solution should aim at the long-period efficiency of these 
firms. 
3. The policy issues in the European context 
The essential theoretical and methodological feature of this report lies in taking what 
could be called an Effective demand approach to study the long run impact of technical 
change on employment. 
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Given that, in our view, Effective demand determines the rate of growth of the 
economy, it is clear that the rate of growth of employment will depend on the difference 
between the growth of effective demand and the rate of growth of labour productivity. 
Was the very slow rate of job creation in Europe in the eighties and nineties the result 
of an abnormally high growth of labour productivity or of an excessively slow growth 
of aggregate demand? 
Despite all the talk of a 'third industrial revolution' and a wave of technological 
unemployment, the data show that the growth of labour productivity in Europe was not 
particularly high (it was certainly lower than in the fifties and sixties, see Ch.3). Yet the 
rate of growth of employment has been very low or even negative (depending on the 
period one choose and on how you define Europe). Therefore it seems that the answer 
to this second question is that aggregate demand did grow at a very slow pace. 
It is possible that in Europe technical change has not been particularly favourable to 
demand growth, for it seems that there has been a concentration on process innovations 
(that tend to destroy jobs) at the expense of product innovations (that favour job 
creation). 
However, this conclusion must be qualified, for technical change does not occur in a 
vacuum. For instance, for process innovations to shift income permanently from wage 
earners it is required that real wages lag behind productivity growth. That seems to have 
occurred in Europe during this period, but that has been a result of complex political 
and economic forces, not of technical change as such. Concerning the alleged slow rate 
of product innovations, it is possible, for example, that faster and more radical changes 
in consumption patterns, and less concentration on process innovations, could have 
been observed had monetary policy and hence consumer credit conditions been looser 
over the period. 
These remarks lead us to what we believe is the central problem concerning technical 
change and employment in Europe. The point is that technical change, particularly if 
concentrated on process innovations, will tend to destroy jobs if the macroeconomic 
policy stance regarding fiscal, monetary, exchange rate and income policy ·has a 
deflationary bias. This bias has been accentuated as a consequence of the criteria 
adopted by the EU for member countries to qualify as part of the process of monetary 
unification. These criteria have become object of public concern ,in the EU.3 At least 
from the point of view of Europe, while technical change as such may not help job 
creation, it cannot be considered the main source of the increase of unemployment. 
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In addition, for any European country and for the EU as a whole, innovation is 
beneficial in terms of competitiveness in foreign markets. Therefore innovation is 
welcome and not to blame. However, much attention should be paid to avoid empty 
formulas. Taking Europe as a closed market, a general increase of competitiveness 
(whatever this means) is a zero sum game. For a single economy or economic 
integrated area (such as the EU), greater efficiency can only lead to output and 
employment growth if it leads to greater exports outside its boundaries. Within a single 
integrated area, a greater competitiveness of a single country can lead to employment 
and output losses for other countries. Accordingly, the positive impact of innovation on 
exports in Italy over 1990-92 has to be seen, at least to a degree,' as advantageous only 
from her point of view. Europe as a whole, would benefit from a better export 
performance of a single country only for that part of exports that go to extra-European 
countries. 
In terms of European industrial policy, the objective of faster technical change in the 
Union should be accompanied by measures aimed at having a balanced distribution and 
diffusion of technological capabilities all around Europe. However, it would be wrong 
to assign to the diffusion of innovation in Europe the objective of full employment. The 
latter requires that a suitable set of macro-economic policies returns on the agenda of 
European governments. 
Footnotes 
1 The delay in the availability of data for our panels for the period subsequent to the devaluation of the 
Italian lira in September 1992 has prevented the planned assessment of the impact of this major event on 
the export performance of the various classes of firms. 
2 No adjustment of the Italian lira within the EMS took place from 1987 till September 1992. The 
indirect effects of EMS have certainly been harmful by determining, jointly to the liberalisation of 
international capital flows. higher domestic interest rates that, in turn, increased the cost of the public 
debt determining, later, restrictive fiscal policies. 
3 It is doubtful that the participation of Italy to a new exchange rate mechanism designed for those 
countries that are excluded from the process of monetary unification will be advantageous. Indeed, l~aly 
may incur again in the disadvantages of fixed exchange rates without the benefit of a common currency. 
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A simple model of long period Effective demand 
Useful to fix ideas about the determination of the long-period level of capacity through 
the autonomous components of aggregate demand is Hicks' concept of the 
supermultiplier (Hicks, 1950; Kaldor, 1970; Serrano, 1995, 1996). 
I 
Equations from [1] to [8] are based on the well-know Keynesian model for the 
determination of the (gross) national income. The (gross) investment level (equation 
[ 4]) is a function of the expected rate of growth of demand. Government expenditure 
(G), autonomous investment (IA) and exports are the autonomous components of 
effective demand (X). 
[1] Y = C+l+G+X-M 
[2] C = c(Y-tY) 
[3] T = tY 
[4] I= ~y [where ~y = Y+1-Y] 
[5] G= Go 
[6] X= Xo 
[7] JA= ~ 
[S]M=mY 
From them the expression for the supermultiplier can be easily derived: 
Y= Go+J$+Xo 
[9] 1-c(1-t)-m-agz 
In writing equation [9] we assume that entrepreneurs expect aggregate demand to grow 
Z-Go+IA+Xo 
at the same rate as the autonomous component of effective demand ( - 0 ) 
that is 
The supermultiplier tells us the level of equilibrium output capacity as a function of the 
levels and rates of growth of the autonomous components of effective demand. On the 
basis of this model, the verbal argument of § 2.3 can so be restated: 
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(i) product innovations increase the marginal propensity to consume (c) and lower the 
import coefficient (m), therefore increasing the amount of capacity generated by given 
patterns of the autonomous components of aggregate demand. In addition they may 
positively affect J$ (may inducing early economic obsolescence of declining products) 
and Xo (by making exports more competitive). 
(ii) process innovations may increase J$ (by inducing early replacement of plants) and 
Xo (by making exports more competitive). They may affect c (making consumer goods 
more accessible) and m (by making domestic products cheaper). Finally, process 
innovation may affect the capital/output coefficient (a), but not in a predictable way. 
Appendix2 
Innovation and autonomous investment 
1. The Schumpeterian thesis 
According to the Schumpeterian economists technological unemployment is a short 
period phenomenon in two senses: 
(a) Albeit with little agreement as to the causes and timing of innovation clusters, 1 these 
economists argue that innovations tend to concentrate over specific periods of time. The 
periodic scarcity of innovations, in particular the lack of major product innovations, is 
what determines cyclical unemployment. In the long run innovations set the trend of 
economic growth. 
(b) During an economic upsurge due to major innovations, unemployment may rise 
because of process innovations (that accompany the mass diffusion of product 
innovation&) and structural change in the composition of jobs. However, technological 
unemployment - so this influential argument goes - is compensated by higher levels 
both of induced and autonomous consumption and of induced and autonomous gross 
investment, all stimulated by the innovations, so that the higher social output leads to 
the recovery, partially at least, of the lost jobs. 
We fully agree that major product innovation can, given the host of additional 
circumstances mentioned in§ 2.3, stimulate the induced and autonomous consumption, 
and through this channel, induced investment. More controversial are the effects of 
technical change on autonomous investment. This aspect is very influential on the 
discussion on the impact of innovations on employment. It is also quite relevant for the 
I • 
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applied work presented in the second part of this report. In this section we focus on 
technical change as a determinant of autonomous investment. 
2. Effects of innovations on composition and level of investment 
We may distinguish between composition and level effects of innovations on gross 
investment. Dealing with the composition effects, we assume that the rate of growth of 
Effective demand is exogenously given. Dealing with the level effects, we take into 
account the impact of autonomous investment decisions on the rate of growth of 
Effective demand (that becomes now partially endogenous). 
2.1. Composition effects of innovations on gross investment 
In a capitalistic economy profit is the sole motivation for production. Therefore, it 
makes sense to assume that firms will want to produce only what they can sell 
profitably. The quantity that firms would like to produce in a given period is thus equal 
to the amount that they would be able to sell at prices which allow them to obtain the 
normally accepted (or required) standard of profitability (or normal rate of profit). 2 
The Prices of Production, or Normal prices, calculated taking into account the normal 
wage costs, the dominant techniques and the normal rate of profit, are precisely the 
prices which incorporate these profitability requirements. If Effective demand is 
defined, as it should be, as the demand forthcoming at these Normal Prices, then it 
follows that the firms' (desired) level of output will be determined (and equal to) the 
level of Effective demand. This being so, the size of the productive capacity that they 
would like to have available in a given period will naturally also be that one which 
allows them to produce the amount of output sufficient to meet (Effective) demand. 
This is true in aggregate, for each sector and for each firm: in the long-period 
productive capacity is determined by the quantity that producers expect to sell at the 
Normal Prices of Production3• 
The expe{:tation of persistently higher levels of Effective demand is the sole 
explanation of decisions to extend productive capacity. For the single firm, productive 
capacity is determined, given the growth rate of Effective Demand for the.products of 
its sector, by its expectations as to the share of demand it expects to satisfy yielding a 
normal profit rate. 
Given the overall rate of growth of Effective demand (whose determination has been 
illustrated in § 2.2), innovative industries may grow at a rate higher than average. This 
because it can be argued that the composition of demand is changing in favour of 
innovative products. Correspondingly, however, less innovative industries would show 
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a below-average growth. The net effect of technical change on the level of gross 
investment is therefore, in general, nil, since the higher growth of gross investment in 
the innovative s.ectors is compensated by the lower rate in the less innovative 
industries.4 Similarly, given the growth rate of demand for the products of a single 
industry, the most innovative firms in that industry may generally grow faster than the 
less innovative. But also in this case the net effect on the level of gross investment is, in 
general, nil. 
It may be concluded that the mere existence of innovative sectors or innovating firms 
does not lead to a higher rate of gross investment, although it changes its composition. 
(Note that also the impact on job creation will be in general nil, the new jobs - if any -
created by the innovators being matched by the lost jobs by the less-innovative). 
2.2. Level effects of innovations on gross investment 
Technical change may induce in competing firms, most likely in innovative industries, 
a level of (autonomous) gross investment higher than that otherwise justified by the 
given patterns of Effective demand. In tum the higher (autonomous) gross investment 
would positively affect Effective demand. More precisely, 'Schumpeterian competition' 
would show itself in two forms: 
(A) in the innovative sectors the expectation of a larger market share by a substantial 
number of competing innovating firms can lead to a level of (autonomous) gross 
investment higher than that justified by the (initially given) rate of growth of Effective 
demand (leading, therefore, to an initial excess of capacity in the sector); 
(B) the competitive process can lead in sectors subject to technical change to the early 
replacement of capital goods, also causing a higher level of gross investment5• This 
early scrapping can also take place between industries through the establishment of new 
industrial sectors (characterised by new products) accompanied by the decline of old 
sectors (Garegnani, 1962, p.96). 
(C) as a result either of (A) (the attempt to subtract market shares from competitors) 
and/or (B) (early replacement), technological competition increases autonomous gross 
investment and, as a consequence, Effective demand. The rise of aggregate demand can, 








2.3. The effects on innovations on autonomous investment are possible but not 
necessary 
So far so good. But how likely is that 'Schumpeterian competition' can sustain long-
period growth of demand and of employment through the effects of innovations on 
(autonomous) gross investment? 
The first objection concerns the persistency of the effect of technological competition 
on gross investment. Let us start from the channel (B). A process of widespread early 
replacement in a sector can be matched by subsequent periods of lower gross 
investment, unless further technical change is in view. Also in case (A), although 
excess capacity can initially be partially matched by higher Effective demand (itself a 
result of the higher autonomous gross investment), the process of adjustment of 
capacity cannot but lead to a fall of gross investment in the subsequent periods. 
Technical change may take place in other sectors, but this is, again,-a matter of history, 
not a logical necessity. 
The effects of technical change on gross investment seem therefore to lack the 
persistency and pervasiveness necessary to assure a long-period growth of Effective 
demand and a stable level of full employment, even as an average over very long 
periods of time. 6 And indeed, Schumpeterian economists are never clear as to why 
innovations cycles should establish a trend rather than just a cycle around a trend to be 
explained by other factors. Indeed, as the results presented in Ch. 5 show over the 
period 1990-92, investment related to innovations is higher in innovating firms both 
during the expansion and the recession. However, the trend seems to reflect that of the 
economy as a whole. 
Secondly, the expected shortening in the economic life of capital goods as a 
consequence of a faster technical change can lead to capital-saving innovations 
(Caminati, 1985),7 or to the postponement of investment (Rosenberg, 1976). In the first 
case the higher autonomous investment determined by early replacement is 
compensated by the lower value of the new capital goods. In the second case, 
replacement is postponed (as long as the firm can remain in the market using 'the 
obsolete technique) until technology has settled. 
Finally, the existence of indivisibilities in the application of new process technologies 
and the importance of the rate of growth of per-capita income in inducing product 
innovations, suggest even a reversal of the causation between demand growth and 
innovation (Schmookler, 1966). Expectations of demand growth may induce fiercer 
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competition among firms, since the larger market reduces the barriers to entry and 
increases the likelihood of survival by product differentiation.8 
It can be concluded that the existence of positive compensation effects to technological 
unemployment on the demand side through (autonomous) gross investment while 
possible, are not a necessary result. This is not to deny that autonomous investment may 
play an important role in the explanation of economic cycles and, in particular, soften 
the impact on employment of falling rates of growth of Effective demand (see Ch.5).9 
Footnotes 
1 According to Schumpeterian economists innovations tend to appear in 'swarms', thus explaining the 
alternation of phases of rapid growth and phases of stagnation. Their timing is attributed to different causes 
such as the scarcity of entrepreneurial capacity, as in the original Schumpeterian theory, or the discontinuity 
of technical progress, the prevailing explanation after Kuznets' (1940) criticism. The causes of this 
discontinuity are still controversial (see the contributions in Freeman, 1983). On the one side Mensch, 
Kleinknecht and others argue that it is the hardship of economic depression that stimulates the search for 
major product innovations giving place to new phases of prosperity, followed, in the expansionary phase, by 
incremental and process innovations. On the other side economists at SPRU, University of Sussex, argue that 
an expansionary macro-environment favours the technological application of independent scientific progress, 
which is however assigned the leading role in the accumulation process. 
2 
'The criterion for investment in a competitive industry is the expectation of a flow of surpluses between 
revenue and current operation costs which, over the life of the investment, are sufficient to recover the 
principal of the investment and earn a normal rate of return' (Salter, 1966, p.55) 
3 Since Normal profitability includes a normal degree of capacity utilisation, the proposition can be 
restated by saying that the long-period productive capacity is determined by the quantity that producers 
expect to sell at a normal degree of capacity utilisation. The normal degree of capacity utilisation is 
generally below the technical maximum feasible degree since firms would usually like to have some 
spare capacity to meet, say, unexpected peaks of demand. 
4 It can be positive if the growing sectors show a higher capitaVoutput ratio. But it can be as well negative if 
the opposite case is true. 
5 
"Whatever may be its effect on net investment, technical progress will normally raise gross investment, in 
so far as it hasten obsolescence and shortens the life of existing capital" (Matthews, 1959, p.68, quoted by 
Caminati, 1986). It can be shown that a shift to capital equipment of a shorter life span will ceteris paribus 
have the same effect as an increase in the capital-output ratio. The Long Period level of investment will then 
increase since now more gross investment is needed for any given level of (expected or actual) Effective 
demand. So a rapid technical change, by shrinking the economic lifetime of fixed capital equipment does 
have a direct impact on investment. 
6 Pasinetti's (1981) model is precisely the description of an economy at full employment in which 
technical progress is such that the economy grows in equilibrium. However, the realism of this approach 
may be questioned. 
7 
"Even when the prevailing empirical circumstances are such that a higher rate of embodied technical 
progress has the effect of shortening the [economic] life of machinery, an increase in gross investment does 
not follow of necessity. To the extent that the shortening of equipment life is foreseen it may induce 
capitalists to adopt fixed capital-saving methods of production" (Caminati, 1986). Caminati provides other 
reasons why the effects of technical change on gross investment could be negative. For instance, the change 






the delay rather than the anticipation of the scrapping of machinery. Also in this case the author concludes 
that "the proposition that embodied technical change fosters earlier scrapping of machinery is fat from being 
general" (p.125). 
8 See Sylos-Labini (1969). The role of the market size in inducing further competition and divisions of 
labour was suggested by Adam Smith: "The increase of demand, besides though in the beginning it may 
sometimes raise the price of goods, never fails to lower it in the long-run. It encourages production, and 
thereby increases the competition of the producers, who, in order to undersell one another, pave recourse to 
new division of labour and new improvements of art, which might never otherwise have been thought of' 
(Smith, 1976 [1776], p.748; see Cesaratto 1996a). 
9 To be sure, Schumpeterian economists are never clear as to why innovations cycles should establish a 
trend rather than just a cycle around a trend to be explained by other factors. 
Appendix3 
Methodological issues 
Two groups of methodological problems have been met : 
( 1) inadequacy of CIS for the problem in hand; 
(2) inadequacies of the data bases and panel data. 
1. Inadequacy of the CIS data 
1.1. Lack of information on employment 
CIS has not been designed to assess the impact of innovations on employment. The 
following 'information gaps' should be noted: 
(i) Information on the evolution of employment (number of employees, temporary lay-
offs, number of effective worked hours) are absent in the questionnaire. 
(ii) Information on the structure of employment is also absent (sex, skills, part-time vs. 
full-time, etc.). 
The only question concerning employment has to be found in section VI (Factors hampering innovation) 
and concerns the difficulty possibly met in finding skilled personnel. This is a limited information and, 
moreover, consists of an "opinion" and it is not a quantitative, objective figure. 
In addition, economic information is limited to Total sales and Exports for the years of 
the Survey. 
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Clearly, survey designers expected some of this information to be available from other statistical sources. 
This is likely the case of the Italian Istituto Nazionale di Statistica (ISTA n. 
To have all the relevant information from the Innovation Survey would facilitate the empirical work, 
although it makes sense for Statistical institutes not to bother firms with information they already 
possess. In addition, data from different surveys, since different persons may fill the questionnaires in the 
same company, may provide different information 1• Information from long established survey is 
probably more reliable than that from new surveys. 
1.2. Missing data in the Italian CIS 
An additional problem concerns missing data. !STAT has not.done any work to fill the 
gaps. An imputation work has been done by us limited to the questions of our direct 
concern and to those firms that presented minor information gaps2• 
1.3. Additional sources of information on employment and other financial variables 
The additional source used to integrate the information on employment and other 
financial information has been a panel of about 27,000 firms included in the Indagine 
sui conti economici delle imprese con piu' di 20 addetti (Survey on the economic results 
of firm with more than 20 employees, SERF). Firms surveyed by SERF include those 
that took part to CIS so that information could be integrated at enterprise level. 
From the SERF we obtained information on employment and on other economic variables. 
In particular: 
(a) number of employees registered in the companies' pay-roll (annual average of the number of 
employees at the end of each month of the year). This figure is gross of the employees temporarily laid-
off (Cassa integrazione guadagni), and this is a serious shortcoming since in the trade cycle actual 
employment may vary a lot as a consequence of lay-offs (see appendix 4). 
(b) number of hours effectively worked by blue-collars. This information partially compensated the 
shortcomings of (a), although is limited to blue collars. 
(c) number of employees subdivided in white and blue-collars, and sex. This is the only information on 
the structure of employment. 
2. Various inadequacies of the data bases 
2.1. Coverage discontinuities 
SERF covered (in 1990) about 32,500 firms with over 20 employees, most of which 
collaborated directly to the survey. In principle SERF should cover all Italian firms with 
more than 20 
1 
employees. However, there are serious gaps in the number of firms 




In the years concerned the number of firms diminishes of 1,200 units in 1990, and increases of 4,000 
units between 1992. The last variation, we have eventually been told by Istat experts, is due to an 
integration of the data base that followed the results of the national Census (data for these additional 
units has been estimated). As a consequence, we have decided to work with a set of data consisting of 
over 26,000 units for which information was available with continuity since 1989. 
In addition, although, in principle, SERF should provide information for all firms. 
included in CIS, this information is actually available only for part of the firms, and 
with temporal discontinuities. Also in this case we decided to work with the set of IF 
and NIF for which information was available for all the years 1990-92. This reduced the 
number of firms to, respectively, 5,962 and 9,534 firms. 
2.2. Delays in the availability of data 
Due to time delays in the availability of SERF figure for 1993, the research team failed 
to meet one research target, that is how the devaluation of the Italian lira in September 
1992 has changed the impact of innovation on Italian export. 
2.3. Additional problems with the data sets 
Once decided to work with a fixed number of units from SERF and from CIS, those for 
which information is available with continuity over the period 1990-92, two further 
'turbulences' in the data deserve· careful attention. The first concerns the changes over 
the peri<;>d of dimensional and industrial classes firms belong to. The second regards a 
significant process of corporate transformations involving a significant number of units. 
2.4. Inter-sectoral and inter-dimensional shifts 
Many firms are multiproduct firms and over a period may change the sector they belong 
to. In principle, this is defined on the basis of the main activity that, of course, may 
change. One cause of this change can be technical change that induces variations in the 
product mix. An additional important cause are the corporate transformations discussed 
below. In addition, changes in the number of employees (determined by the econoinic 
cycle, by technical change and by corporate transformations) may shift firms from a 
class of employees to another. 
There is actually a relative 'stability' in the number of firms in each class, both in CIS and in SERF. For 
instance, in the period 1990-92 the number of small IF diminishes of only 30 units (over 5 thousand 
small firms are included in the Italian CIS). The similar figure for SERF is 25 units. In the analysis, 
however, we have noticed that these small changes may have a visible impa~t on the aggregate results. 
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The best (and workable) solution we envisaged to this problem has been to assign firms 
of our panels to the sectoral and dimensional class they belonged to in a base-year (the 
obvious choice was the first year, 1989). 
2.5. Corporate transformations 
IST AT experts estimate that the number of formal or substantial transformations in the 
legal status of surveyed firms is a very relevant phenomenon. Transformations consist 
of mergers and separations that may concern a part or the whole of one or more 
companies. The box shows a taxonomy of corporate transformations proposed by Istat 
(1995, p.75). 
a) Sell of activities 
- Discontinuance of a finn that hands over the activity to another company 
- Partial sell of activities to other companies 
b) Acquisition of activities 
-Birth of a new fmn by the acquisition of an activity from an existing fmn 
- Modification of an existin~ finn bv the acquisition of other activities 
Over the years 1989-1993 Istat has recorded about 3,800 episodes of corporate transfonnation in the 
manufacturing sector, about 10% of the total number of finns. Most of the largest companies have been 
involved in corporate transfonnations, mainly consisting of the acquisition of smaller fmns. Smaller 
companies tend indeed to sell activities. Modern rather than traditional sectors are more likely to be 
involved in the transfonnations. 
Two experts of the problem have recently concluded that: 
"It is clear that in any micro-econometric investigation on large finns strong risks are taken of bad 
specifications, and the relative consequences cannot be assessed a priori, given the scarce systematicity 
of the knowledge on the phenomena of mergers, acquisitions, transfers" (Contini, Monducci, 1995, 
p.7; see also Barca, Magnani, 1989, Ch.4, appendix 1l 
Unfortunately, there is little that we can do to solve this problem that constitutes a 
serious limitation for the empirical results. For instance, corporate transformation 
determines the shifts mentioned above in § 2.1. To give another example, some IF may 
have changed the number of employees just because it merged with another firm. 
2.6. Problems with panel data 
On the one side, there is a loss of information by working with closed panels, since 
firms' births and deaths are not taken into account, and they are, of course, an important 




concern a closed panel of firms, so that it made sense to compare it to similar closed 
panels of firms. 
Footnotes 
1 This is the case for the Italian CIS with regard to information concerning sales and exports. 
2 The method employed to fill the gap simply consisted of replacing the missing figures with the average 
values of firms of similar size and sector. Few ftrms whose questionnaires presented too many missing 
values have been erased from our sample. 
3 The economic explanation of corporate transformations may lay in structural change (processes of 
vertical and horizontal integrations/disintegrations), but also, likely, in the characteristics of the Italian 
corporate system. Small ftrms tend to grow, for instance, by creating new firms. Divisions in large Italian 
multi-divisional firmS tend to be independent legal units, so that organizative changes may take the 
form of corporate transformations. 
Appendix4 
The divergence between the variations of employment and hours 
worked 
The figures presented in chapter 5 show a divergence between the average growth rates 
of employment and hours worked. While hours worked fall in each year, employment 
rises (or falls more moderately) in 1990 and 1991. The divergence is more marked for 
IF (with the exception of small IF). 
The two indicators refer, respectively, to total employees (i.e. both white and blue 
collars) gross of temporary lay-offs, and to hours worked of blue collars. The first 
indicator tends to smooth the actual variations of employment. The second indicator, 
since it includes over-time, it is only a proxy of the variation in the number of blue 
collars, and tends to vary more than the latter over the cycle 
Table A3 shows the Spearman correlation coefficients between the rates of change of 
some variables over the period 1990-92 for three size classes for IF and SERF. In spite 
of the divergence in the averages shown in the tables, the correlation between changes 
in employment and hours worked is positive, high and statistically significant in all 
classes. Both indicators are also highly correlated with variations of value added. Hence 
we find confirmation of the expectation that at firm level employment and hours 
worked (and, to a lesser extent due to the possibility of labour saving technical change, 
also value added) should all tend to move in the same direction, and that the ranking of 
the size of the changes in these variables should also be correlated. 
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Tab. A3 • Speanaa ......,..lion coelllcient between the....,. or dtance or employmont, worked hoo&nud value-added 
INNOVATING FIRMS SERF 
20·199 employees 21J..l99 employees 
EMPL. HOURS WORK. WHJ1E-COLL. BLUE-COLL. VALUE-ADDED · EMPL. HOURS WORK. WHITE-COLL. BLUE-COLL. VALUE·ADDED : ;- ' 
EMPL. 1.00 
WORK. HOURS 0.59 l.IXl 0.52 
WHITE-COLL. 0.45 ().()5 1.00 0.33 -0.07 
BLUE-COLL. 0.80 0.71 O.DJ 1.00 0.75 0.68 -ll.l5 
V ALUE·ADDED 0.50 0.38 0.35 0.35 I.()() 0.41 0.3 0.34 0.22 
200-499 employees 200-499 employees 
EMPL. HOURS WORK. WHITE-COLL. BLUE-COLL. VALUE-ADDED EMPL. HOURS WORK. WHITE-COLL BLUE-COLL. VALUE-ADDED 
EMPL. 1.00 
'VORK.HOURS 073 l.IXl 0.69 
WHITE·COLL. 0.63 0.29 1.00 0.56 0.21 
BLUE-COLL. 0.85 0.82 0.29 f.()() 0.83 0.8 0.18 
VALUE-ADDED 0.56 0.54 0.37 0.47 1.00 0.49 0.44 0.37 0.37 
Over SOD employees Over SOD employees 
EMPL. HOURS WORK. WHITE-COLL. BLUE-COLL. VALUE-ADDED EMPL. HOURS WORK. WHITE-COLL. BLUE-COLL. VALUE-ADDED 
EMPL. 1.00 
WORK.HOURS 0.76 1.00 0.71 
WHITE·COLL. o.n 0.50 1.00 o.n 0.45 
BLUE-COLL. 0.83 0.84 0.46 1.00 0.82 0.81 0.45 
VALUE-ADDED 0.54 0.48 0.49 0.40 1.00 0.55 0.45 O.Sl 0.38 
Note: All the coefficients are statistically stgnificant at a level of 0.01 .... 
Soun:e: !STAT, CIS, SERF. 
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It remains to be explained why, when we look at the averages in the tables, we find a 
divergence between changes in hours worked and employment. More specifically, we 
must explain why the data indicate a better performance of employment with respect to 
hours worked, especially in the first two years. 
The years we observe are the end of an expansion and the beginning of a recession (the 
through of which is in 1993). In such a phase the firms that are still expanding their 
employment are likely to do so mostly by new hirings (having already re-employed 
laid-off workers and stretched working times in the earlier phase of the expansion). By 
contrast the firms that are beginning to contract are more likely to do so by reductions 
in over-time and lay-offs, thereby reducing total hours worked. Whereas the increase in 
employment through new hirings and the reduction in worked hours are visible on our 
data, lay-offs are not. In 1992, the figures are not divergent, as with the deepening of 
the economic recession expanding firms become rare, while contracting firms begin to 
reduce labour inputs not so much via further reductions in over-time and temporary lay-
offs but, increasingly, by making workers (some of whom previously laid off) 
redundant. 1 
A seqond factor that contributes to explaining the divergence between hours worked 
and employment is the changing composition of the labour force in favour of white- · 
collar workers. This is shown by results discussed in § 5.3, according to which in IF 
and SERF the share of white-collars on the total labour-force has increased by about 
1.5% over the period 1989-1992, and in a lesser measure (0.7%) in NIF. This may ~ 
due to the fact that employment of blue-collar workers tend to change more over the· 
cycle, or to structural change in the composition of the labour force - most probably to a 
combination of the two. 
Because data on employment are gross of lay-offs and hence tend to 'hide' changes in 
actual employment we regard hours worked as a better indicator of variations in labour 
inputs. However, one may wonder if hours worked may be indeed regarded as a proxy 
for changes in employment, when we consider that they (a) do not include white collars' 
worked hours and (b) they include over-time - hence their changes may not reflect 
changes in actual employment of blue-collar workers. To discuss these problems let us 
look again at table A3, which shows the Spearman correlation coefficients between the 
variables we are concerned with. 
Let us deal with question (b) first. Evidently, hours worked tend to change more than 
employment. However the correlation between worked hours and employment of blue-
collar workers is positive and high both for IF and SERF. 
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Concerning question (a), the main problem would be the existence of some systematic 
tendency for employment of white and blue-collar workers to move in opposite 
direction. This might happen for example as a consequence of a systematic tendency for 
innovation in this period to bring about an increase in white-collar employees at the 
same time as a fall in employment of blue-collar workers. Let us look at the correlation 
between employment of white and blue-collar workers in IF first. The coefficient is 
always positive, is very low for small firms and increases with size. The pattern is 
similar for SERF but the coefficient has a negative sign as well as a very low value for 
the class of small firms. The correlation coefficient between hours worked and white-
collar employment follows a similar pattern in both groups of firms. 
The very low correlation coefficient for small IF that become negative in the case of 
small firms included in SERF, can be explained by the existence of 'indivisibilities' in 
the white-collar staff in this class (and, to a lesser extent, in the medium size class), due 
to its small size. These indivisibilities prevent it from changing proportionally to 
changes in value added or blue-collar employment. In addition, as white-collar 
employment is a relatively low proportion of total employment in small firms, the lack 
of correlation between white and blue-collar employment and hence between the former 
and hours worked in this class of firms does not appear to represent a major drawback 
for our use of the latter as the main indicator of changes in employment. Finally, the 
substitution process of white to blue collar workers would take place in opposite 
directions in small If and in small SERF firms, since in the former (blue-collars') hours 
worked were increasing, whereas in the latter they were falling. Therefore, it seems 
difficult to attribute the low or negative correlation coefficient for small firms to any 
systematic pattern of 'substitution' of white for blue-collar workers. 
Finally, our choice of hours worked as the best indicator is also supported by the fact 
that variations in hours worked are closer to the variations in the standard units of 
labour (or equivalent full time number of all dependent employees) in the entire 
manufacturing sector (i.e. including firms with less than 20 employees) in the period, as 
it results from the National Accounts (see bottom of tables 5.2 and 5.3). 
Footnotes 
1 This account finds support in the authoritative Annual Reports of the Banca d'Italia: 'The growth in total 
employment, measured in standard labour units, accelerated from 0.2% in 1989 to 1% [in 1990] ( -0.1% 
in the manufacturing sector}, contrasting with the deceleration in GOP growth. The divergence was due 
to the lagged response of employment to the sustained economic expansion of the eighties'. According to 
the Bank, overtime declined from 5.6% of total worked-hours in 1989 to 5.1% in 1990, and the recourse 
to the 'wage supplementation fund' increased of 53.5% in 1990. Those two factors caused the number of 
worked-hours to fall of 2.4% (Banca d'Italia 1991, 1992). In 1991 the recourse to the fund increased of 







necessary adjustments in their work-force any longer. As a result, [in 1992] employment declined more 
sharply than in 1991 ( ... ),more than wiping out the modest increase recorded over the three years from 
1987 to 1989'. In 1991 overtime fell at 4.9% of total hours worked and many workers previously 
receiving benefits from the wage supplementation fund were finally dismissed by their employers (Banca 
d'ltalia 1992). 
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Appendix5 
Results of factor and cluster analyses 
The variables used in principal component and cluster analyses have been listed in 
Ch.61• 
Principal components analysis reduced the number of variables to 7 (also called 'latent 
factors' or 'principal components'). These principal components explain 75% of the total 
variance of the original data matrix. An economic interpretation of the 7 components 
can be provided by looking at their correlation with the original variables (that they are 
supposed to synthesise). 
factor 1: is positively associated to continuous R&D (var.l) and negatively to the 
absence of R&D (var.lB). 
factor 2: is linked to those variables that represent the financial effort of firms in 
innovative activities (var.2, 3 and 4). 
factor 3: is positively linked to the share of sales consisting of significant product 
innovations (var.l5), and negatively to the share innovated from the point of view of 
processes (var. 13). 
factor 4: is related to the relevance of occasional R&D activities (var.lA). 
factor 5: is associate to the share of innovation costs devoted to design (var.7) and to 
incremental product innovations (var.l4). 
factor 6: is linked to the importance of trial production(var.8) and marketing (var.9). 
factor 7: is associated with the importance of the acquisition of licenses. 
On the basis of these factors, cluster analysis has carried out using a 'non-hierarchical 
algorithm' (the software used was SAS-Fast-Clus). The next problem was to find the 
optimum number of groups. A 'local optimum' number has been selected on the basis of 
two tests (PSEUDO F and Cubic Clustering Criterion). The selection of a 'global 
optimum' number would have resulted in a too large number of groups. 
1 It can be noted that variables [1], [IA] and. [IB] are 'qualitative' (not-metric), while factor analysis is 
best applied to metric variables. However the statistical package we used (SAS) permits to transform 
non-metric in metric variables (PRINQUAL, qualitative principal component analysis). 

